
IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED HEAV
AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH AND DWELT AMONG US
Coming
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cum permissu superiorum

God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII

Encyclical Humani Generis

THE MARIAN YEAR

This is the year of the Virgin. As our readers are aware, in the Encyclical *Fulgens Corona,* our Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, has proclaimed a Marian Year of special devotion to Our Blessed Lady. The occasion of this proclamation is the celebration of the centenary of the Solemn Definition of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX on December 8, 1854.

The purpose of the Marian Year, as put forth in the encyclical, are: to intensify devotion to the Mother of God, to induce the faithful to conform themselves more closely to the pattern set before us in the life of her who was immaculately conceived, and to invoke the powerful intercession of the glorious Queen of Heaven for the alleviation of the many evils which today beset the Church and human society throughout the world.

It is the wish of the Holy Father that there be held in each diocese special devotions in honor of the Immaculate Virgin. His Holiness also commands sermons and lectures explaining Mary's unique privileges that have been bestowed upon her because of that ineffable dignity. These discourses are to be centered upon the Immaculate Conception at the beginning of her earthly existence, her sinless and perfect life during its course, and her glorious Assumption in to heaven at its close.

In order to implement the wishes of the Holy Father, an extensive program of lectures on Mariology has been inaugurated for the students of philosophy and theology in the Province of St. Albert the Great. At the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy at River Forst, separate Marian lectures are being given weekly throughout this semester for the members of each of the three classes there. These lecures are being delivered by the Very Reverend S. E. Carlson, O.P., S.T.M., S.T.D., Regent of Studies of the Province of St. Albert the Great; the Very Reverend J. W. Curran, O.P., B.S.T., S.T.D., former *Baccalaureus* of the Studium and Vice-President of the Faculty; and the Reverend P. G. Hinnebusch, O.P., S.T.Lr., Chaplain of Trinity High School, River Forest. The professors

of the Pontifical Faculty will also give a series of lectures on Our Blessed Lady for the laity at St. Vincent Ferrer's Church Hall, River Forest.

A similar series of Marian discourses has been planned for the Theological Faculty at St. Rose of Lima Priory, Dubuque. The lectures at Dubuque will begin on March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Reverend L. B. Cunningham, O.P., S.T.Lr., S.T.D., professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Rose, will give this first lecture on *St. Thomas and Mariology.* Subsequent lectures will be given in May and October by other members of the Theological Faculty. The tentative subjects for these lectures are: during May, the cult of Mary, the Divine Maternity, Mary's merit, the triumph of Mary over Satan; during October, the Immaculate Conception, Mary's plenitude of grace, Mary's immunity from the remains of sin, Mary and Joseph, the Assumption; and finally on December 8, St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception.

The purpose of this program in honor of the Blessed Virgin is indicated by the Holy Father when he directs in the Encyclical that these special sermons and discourses be preached "so that the faith of the people may be increased and their devotion to the Virgin Mother of God become daily more inflamed, and that henceforth all may take upon themselves to follow in the footsteps of our heavenly Mother, willingly and with promptitude."

THE EDITORS

THOMAS THE MAN

A STRIKING PARADOX frustrates the attempt to dislodge Thomas Aquinas, the man, from the brilliance of his sanctity. His giant humanity lies dormant, almost lost in the shadows of the centuries. Today, this man who possessed a perfect personality is considered impersonal and unattractive. The warmth that was Thomas is hidden by the seeming coldness of his precise rationality.

If the fault for this distorted image can be assigned to anyone, it must be given, again paradoxically, to the one who knew and loved him best, Reginald of Piperno. Despite his familiarity with the saint, despite the confidence he enjoyed as companion of Thomas, Reginald avoids all references to him that might abstract from saintliness. He gives a true picture of Thomas the saint, as he knew him, leaving Thomas the friend in the background. He molds a plaster Thomas, hallowed but hollow, and trimmed with little beyond the niceties of spiritual beauty. But this was done, no doubt, in conformity with the ideals of the Middle Ages, which would not tolerate saints who were too human or too loveable, preferring to reverence them in awe, at a distance.

Again, biographers and commentators of St. Thomas must share the blame. As philosophers and theologians they are not interested in his personality. They are interested only in his theology and philosophy. They wish only to expose the marvelous Thomistic system. It is understandable that in their flurry to know Thomas the theologian, they forgot Thomas the man.

But a saint is a man before he is a saint; and it is according to the diverse types of men that many kinds of saints will be found. The common man does not choose a saint because of the saint's holiness alone, but because of the attractive personality which compliments his holiness, the very human things which make a saint a saint.

Physically Thomas was a large handsome man with expressive eyes pointing up a placid countenance. It has been said that his size was so outstanding, that as he strode along the roads from city to city, field

workers would raise their heads to stare after him in amazement. But height and color and handsomeness do not always make up a strong man. Even though he seemed to have the advantages of physical strength, he was delicate and acutely sensitive to the least bodily pain. At times when he was forced to undergo bloodletting or when his leg ulcers had to be cauterized, he endured the torture by concentrating on some philosophical or theological problem which had been raised. Like most men who have little of the stoical about them in their private lives, he used the nearest anesthesia in the face of suffering.

Regardless of his extreme sensitiveness and suffering, however, Aquinas was a man of intense action. Though he never completely shook off the shyness of his childhood, which in many instances was cause for bullying by his companions, still he wrote and spoke without fearing the cries against him. And he did these things with all the earnestness of which he was capable. During his life he carried on pursuits which a man of less vigor could not have undertaken. At times when he was not working in his cell, Thomas rid himself of excess energy by walking about the cloisters, head high, taking colossal strides.

A common misconception shrouding the personality of St. Thomas portrays him as the perfect example of the absent-minded philosopher. Those who receive this impression do so on the basis of superficial facts. Out of fairness they should look deeper. It is true that Thomas was given Reginald of Piperno to look after his affairs. It is also true that he had to be forced to eat and sleep by this companion. The untruth is that he needed to be cared for because of absent-mindedness. Absent-mindedness springs from a lack of control over the mind. It is obvious that Thomas' mind was ever brilliant and direct. Therefore, his inattentiveness was due to over-concentration rather than absent-mindedness.

He was sufficiently aware of events going on about him, and could deliver wise counsel to all kinds of people, from princes to peasants. His superiors showed great faith in his genius by assigning him the task of establishing several houses of study. Even the Popes who reigned during his lifetime turned to him with their problems. Again, he is said to have been always punctual at the convent's community exercises. These things would not be expected of a dreamer, of a man with no practical wisdom.

Still another false impression gleaned from centuries of misapprehension implies that Aquinas, the massive intellect, separated himself from society. His very vocation rendered this impossible. The friar preacher is not a man of the world. Nevertheless, he is a man in the world. His cloister encompasses cities and nations. He goes out to men. He does not wait for men to come to him. Aquinas was no different. In what other way could he have shown his understanding of everyday human problems? How else could he have studied man in his manhood?

He was only fair to his conscience when he practiced his own thought that nothing is in the intellect unless it is first in the senses. Thomas not only went out to men, but he learned from them many of the things which he later set down for them. It was his extraordinary common sense that guided his own senses.

By reason of his warm Italian nature, Thomas possessed a fiery magnetic personality. He was born a nobleman. What is more, he knew he was a nobleman. His wellbred shyness developed the humility which made him realize that he was not only head and shoulders over his contemporaries in intelligence, but also that he surpassed them by lordly birth. The point to remember is this. Despite the fact that his advantages outshone many of his adversaries, never once did he try to dim them with his former wealth and position and influence. Never once did he try to bully them with his mind. He answered objections humbly, the only way he knew how, with truth.

Again, by reason of his warm nature, Aquinas had to hold in check his passionate temperament. The incident of his attempted seduction bears witness. He did not try to talk the woman out of her mission. He drove her out with vehemence. It was an act carried out by self-knowledge and acquired discipline. Pope Pius XI made the striking comment that, "If St. Thomas' purity had failed at this critical moment, it was very likely that the Church would never have had an Angelic Doctor,"[1] which shows that the fruition of a theological system depended on one man struggling for virtue.

Thomas, the man, did not place himself above other men. He was too human for that. No human emotion was below him. He straightened them up and made them work for him. Perhaps the most outstanding emotion of this seemingly cold philosopher which he controlled and used in an admirable manner was the emotion of love. Besides his love of God and God's created universe, because of God he felt a hearty personal love for those about him. Two men stand out in his life as being his closest friends. Reginald of Piperno has already been mentioned. To him Thomas dedicated his *Compendium Theologiae* with the words: "To Brother Reginald, most dear of companions." These words were not written lightly. Thomas never did anything lightly. He must really have loved this Reginald who cared for his needs. He must have realized the devotion that Reginald paid to him. It was this mutual understanding and good-will which allowed them to live together in the true sense of the word friendship; a perfect friendship, rational before God.

His love for Albert the Great flourished from the time of his student days at Cologne until his death. The teacher of Aquinas defended his

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1A.D. Sertillanges, O.P., *St. Thomas Aquinas and His Work* (London: Burns, Oates, & Washburne, Ltd., 1932) p. 14.

shy pupil from the barbs of classmates and phophesied his future brilliance. Moreover he steadfastly combatted Thomas' opponents who sprang up after the saint's death. So great was Albert's love for Thomas that he was never able to control his tears whenever the name Aquinas was recalled to him.

Besides these personal friends, he naturally possessed a deep family feeling. This is typical of a man born to a proud clan. Even in view of the fact that his parents and brothers rebelled at the idea of his joining the begging friars, he was loyal to them. The news of his brothers' deaths caused him great personal pain. This influence and love for his sisters caused one of them to become a nun.

Now, because of his ability to love, Aquinas was also loveable. His loveableness is best expressed by his unselfishness. Self-love was never permitted to dominate him. It was because he had great love of self and greater love for God that he experienced love of others.

Thomas felt the greatest love when truth was involved. To him, only truth was good, because truth was rational. Falsity smacked of irrationality and consequently was hated with intensity. Thomas could not contain his emotion when truth was to be embraced. On one occasion for the sake of truth his anger broke forth from his pen. The Averroists had been for some time slyly leading young students of the university of Paris into error. Thomas wrote a treatise entitled *De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas.* The last paragraph of this treatise was a window for his righteous anger. He wrote:

> If anyone, boasting of knowledge falsely so called, wishes to say anything against what I have written, let him not speak in corners or to children, who are no judges of such difficult matters, but let him write against this treatise, if he dare; and he will find not only me, who am the least of all, but many others, lovers of truth, who will confound his error, or put an end to his ignorance.[2]

This was one of the few times during his life that he expressed himself so strongly.

We come now to the last great paradox of St. Thomas. The paradox of a perfect personality being almost perfectly impersonal in his writings. Many writers write to express themselves. They write to scatter their ideas, to attract attention. It is the mark of an author whose style is smooth and beautiful to be able to enchant the reader less with what he says than the way he says it. Thomas was hardly enchanting. He knew that he was no Augustine. He did not try to be an Augustine. He strove only for the clarity of a scholar. He wanted to be clear with no chance of being misunderstood, as happens sometimes when truths are smothered in emotional vagaries. He placed wisdom on paper coldly, leaving the appendages of self to wilt in his own mind. He was like an artist who discovers beauty in simplicity; and simplicity is

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2*Ibid.*, p. 26.

painted most beautifully when it is painted precisely. It is precisely because he was precise that Thomas was most simple. And it is because he was simple that he was most profound. The scholar in him looked for no other enchantment except the enchantment of wisdom.

Yet, in the coldest and most precise of his works, the *Summa Theologiae,* a discerning student cannot fail to grasp the warmth that is St. Thomas. Despite its scientific impersonalness, it could have been written only by a man who possessed an unparalleled personal knowledge of the labyrinth of human joys and miseries. For example, Thomas prescribes a hot bath and a tranquil sleep for reducing sorrow. He calls the most hopeful people in the world children and the intoxicated; children because they have not yet experienced the misfortunes of the world, and the intoxicated because they have found relief from theirs. He sympathizes with the unmarried girls of the world by condoning their use of cosmetics. He sympathizes with the married women in the same way, permitting them the use of make-up as a means of keeping their husbands interested. Again, Thomas wrote of the Nativity at length, placing exactly every detail, seeming to delight in this mystery. Could this have been done by a man who was all mind and no heart?

It is impossible, therefore, to leave the *Summa* without taking part of Thomas' personality. He teaches simply and humbly, striving to correct the errors of those who went before him; striving to open the way for his contemporaries in their misunderstandings. He is too generous to criticize without sympathy. He always seemed eager to learn from others and to quote passages from their works which seemed to him correct and to the point. He always gave credit where credit was due, without envy, when a truth had been discovered.

Moreover, the man Thomas who is held in awe because of his near angelic intellect, had all of the human weaknesses when it actually came to putting to paper the fruit of that intellect. He did not sit down and let his thoughts flow beautifully and easily. Writing is hard work and he knew it. Perhaps he would never have written anything if he had been less patient and industrious and had less love for the welfare of others. As it is, he was a ready writer, but not without the defects that are characteristic of most writers.

The few pieces still extant written in his own hand, reveal mistakes which he usually corrected, but not always. These mistakes are mistakes of distraction and errors due to haste. Often an important word is repeated or left out. He sometimes reaches conclusions which are not expressed exactly the way he would like. These he scratches out and puts the new conclusion above. Again, the new one may be crossed through and still another written above. Sometimes words of opposite meaning used in the same passage may become mixed in usage. While treating of the Goodness of God, where the words "bonum" and "malum" were woven in and out frequently, Thomas' mind thought,

"Deus est summum bonum," but his pen write, "Deus est summum malum." The mistake was immediately corrected. As these common errors show, he was less interested in the expression than in the meaning he wished to convey.[3]

Finally, we find the personality of St. Thomas flowing through his poetry. He does not bother himself with the mere magic of word combination. His magic lies in the marvelous didactic content of simple, terse verses. He bludgeons the reader with the beauty and truth of doctrine. He allows no bypaths of florid description or dynamic crescendos to distract. His poems cannot be compared to an unpredictable raging ocean storm; rather, they are superficially calm, each accent breaking rythmically like the waves of a sated sea. He rages only with rationality and simplicity. He strikes with the austerity of wisdom.

Here then is Aquinas pushed from his pedestal of impersonality. He is once more clothed with a humanity which is personal, a humanity which made him a saint. It can be truly said of him that he possessed the mind and body of a giant and the heart of a child.

Bernard O'Riley, O.P.

3C. Lattey, S.J., *St. Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 44.

SUAREZ AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

EVEN AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS has provided the doctrinal foundation for centuries of Dominican intellectual activity, so in a like manner, the doctrines of Francisco Suarez have profoundly influenced much of the philosophical and theological endeavor of the Society of Jesus. Yet, as is well known, the philosophical synthesis of St. Thomas and Suarez differ widely in their solutions to many important problems besetting the Church and all mankind today.

As a consequence, therefore, of the far-reaching influence which the Society of Jesus and the Order of Preachers have each exerted over the minds and hearts of so many Christians, the Church has to some extent at least, been divided into two intellectually, though not spiritually, opposed camps. In these troubled times, however, when Holy Mother Church is being attacked by so many enemies from without, it is most desirable that she be unified intellectually as well as spiritually from within. This could be effected to a considerable extent were it possible for Suarezian doctrine to be reconciled to the philosophy of St. Thomas, which as we know, has been officially sanctioned by the Church and urged upon all Catholic schools and seminaries by Canon Law.

However, if two different philosophies are diverse, that is to say, contradictory, not only in their conclusions, but even in their fundamental principles, their reconciliation is impossible. Where one doctrine would deny what the other holds as essentially true, the very foundations of the doctrine under attack are thereby destroyed. Yet the fundamental principle of all Thomistic philosophy finds its contradictory proposition contained in the philosophy of Suarez. Therefore, we must conclude that Suarezianism is even fundamentally irreconcilable to the philosophy of St. Thomas, nay more, that Suarezian philosophy would destroy Thomism by assailing the very foundation — the very careful principle — on which it is built.

A conclusion of such moment must be proved, for if the philosophy of St. Thomas is to be taught in all Catholic seminaries and schools in accordance with the wishes of the Church, Suarez's philosophy must necessarily be abandoned because of its intrinsic opposition to St. Thomas' teaching.

This article, then, has for its task the proof of this conclusion – the intrinsic opposition of Suarezianism to the philosophy of St. Thomas – and therefore, must verify the premise on which that conclusion stands, namely, that the fundamental principle of all Thomistic philosophy finds its contradictory proposition in the philosophy of Suarez.

With the verification of this premise as our goal, we shall proceed as follows: first, we must state and explain the fundamental principle of Thomistic philosophy, both as a review and as an aid to our interpretation of Suarez; then we shall go to the philosophy of Suarez to see if therein is really contained a proposition contradictory to this basic tenet of St. Thomas' philosophy. If there is such a proposition, then our conclusion is valid, making explicitly certain what is already implicitly conceded by those familiar with the problem.

Our field of investigation is metaphysics, because it is metaphysics which treats of first principles.

The fundamental principle of Thomistic philosophy is this: *Act of itself is unlimited, and if limited, it is so only because it has been received by a potency really distinct from itself.* This principle will be better understood after a brief analysis of its terms.

Potency may be described as a capacity for receiving some act and it can be understood only in relation to that act, as a receptacle is only really understood in relation to that which it receives. There are various kinds of potency, and it can be divided as follows:



A *possible* or *logical* potency is a possible essence, that is, an essence which though it does not yet exist, could at some time exist. This logical essence is *intrinsically* possible, because its essential notes or components are mutually compatable, as for example, animality and rationality—it is possible for both to co-exist in the same subject. The same logical essence or potency is also said to be *extrinsically* possible when there exists an extrinsic power or force capable of producing it, that is, of giving it the further perfection of existence. A possible essence, therefore, is evidently not simply *nothing*, if only because we can predicate of it possibilities which in no way can ever be thought or even said of *nothing*.

In contradistinction to possible potency, an *actual* potency is one which actually exists here and now. Actual potencies may be either *active* or *passive*.

An *active* potency is the capacity of doing something or of performing some activity. The term, *uncreated* active potency is used in reference to God's power of creating, conserving, and directing his creatures. A *created* active potency is the principle of operation in creatures. It may be either remote or proximate. For example, the soul is the remote principle of all man's activities; and the will and intellect are the proximate principles of his deliberate actions.

A *passive* potency, or potency in the strict sense, is the capacity, not of doing something, but of receiving something, namely, of receiving some act. A *pure* passive potency such as *prime matter* has absolutely no act, either formal or entitative. Prime matter is that which *is* potentially. A *mixed* passive potency is one which from one aspect is in act, yet from another aspect is still in potency. *Formal act* or the form of an actual essence is a mixed passive potency insofar as it is in act in the essential order; but in the existential order, in relation to the act of existence, it remains a potency. In the same way, an *existing substance* is said to be in potency inasmuch as it has a capacity for receiving accidents.

Act may be described as a certain perfection, as human nature is said to be one perfection of man, while his act of existence is another and greater perfection. Human nature is an act or perfection in the order of essence, whereas existence is a further act or perfection in the order of existence.

The various kinds of act may be classified as follows:

- **ACT**
  - Pure Act
  - Mixed Act
    - Entitative finite
    - Formal
      - Angelic or incorporeal
      - Corporeal

Pure act is one which has not been received in any potency whatsoever. Being act in both the essential and existential order, it can in no way be considered as potential, nor can it be considered in potency to any further or higher act. Not having been received into a potency, nor in potency to further act, it *is* act, pure and simple, infinite and unlimited. This pure act can be no other than God. The essence of God has not received His existence; it *is* His existence, and thus, God is distinguished from all his creatures, in whom existence has been received and limited by essence.

A *mixed* act is one which has been received into a potency, such as the *entitative finite* act of existence which has been received by an essence. It is that act *by which* (*quo*) an essence is constituted as actually existing and from which it is really distinct, as act is distinct from potency.

For example, the existence which a man has is limited by his essence. This essence, which though itself truly an act in the essential order, is nevertheless still a potency with regard to its existence in the existential order. In other words, his human nature or essence is a potency in relation to the existence which it has received, from which it is really distinct, and over which it has set the limits of its own capacities for existence.

Formal act, on the other hand, is the act of essence or form, which is in act insofar as it is a perfection of the essential order, yet is in potency to the further act of existence.

We can further distinguish two kinds of formal act: the *angelic* form which, though itself unreceived by any potential principle, is receptive of existence, and a *corporeal* form which is not only receptive of existence, but itself has been received into prime matter, its correlative principle.

Act, as it is a certain perfection or the principle of perfection, cannot at the same time and under the same aspect be the principle of its own imperfection. Of itself, act is perfect and unlimited. Any limitations which act may acquire must come from something really distinct from itself, from some other principle of imperfection which has a capacity for just so much act, and this is potency.

This principle of the nature and distinction of act and potency is the fundamental principle of all Thomistic philosophy because it is the fundamental intrinsic principle of all reality; and Thomism is a philosophy of reality as such. *Act and potency so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is necessarily composed of act and potency as to its intrinsic principles.*[1]

Now let us move on to an investigation of Suarez's philosophy in our quest for his principle regarding the nature and distinction of act and

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1Cf. S. Stud. Congr.; July 27, 1914. A.A.S. VI, 383ss. Thesis I.

potency. But first, it would be well to take a quick look at the age in which Suarez lived and developed his philosophy, for perhaps we can find there some hint or key that will open to us a better understanding of the "why" and the "how" of what he did.

Sixteenth century Europe was shrouded in the pall of error consequent on the decline of scholasticism. She was at once on the crest of the Renaissance and in the wake of the Reformation; *Self* came to its full stature on the pedestal of Humanism only to be torn into dissident, selfish factions on the rack of heresy.

While philosophy was made to descend to the practical, with a consequent degeneration into Logic, the practical sciences ascended to the throne on which *Scientia Divina* had once reigned supreme. Experiment became the scepter of power, while truth was allowed to wane in the dungeons of closed minds. Nominalism was on the rampage, Thomism rejected by the then moderns as too abstract and impractical, and Scotism shunned for its inherent contradictions.

Europe's plight having wasted its fury against the rocks of the Pyrenees, Spain alone was able to revel in a revival of scholasticism. Her colors, though torn by hair-splitting distinctions and intercollegiate bickering, might once again, it was hoped, be pieced together and carried proudly in the battle against the enemies of the Church and the Gospel.

And so, while eminent doctors were busily *measuring* the number of angels that could stand on the head of a pin, there arose one Francis Suarez, in the year of our Lord, 1548, who, showing great promise by his calm, rigorous method and temperate nature, set out to remold scholasticism into one cohernt system that could give a rational substantiation to Catholic theology. In obedience to the command of his superiors, he set about synthesizing Thomism and Scotism in an effort to reconcile these two intrinsically opposed schools of philosophical thought.

Suarez[2] was first and foremost a theologian, his purely philosophical investigations being subordinated to the needs of his theology and for the most part confined to the field of metaphysics, which he preferred to treat from the standpoint of a logician, as did many of the schoolmen of his time. It was in metaphysics that Suarez set out to find the *via media*[3] between Thomism on the one hand and Scotism and Ockamism on the other, by taking what he thought was best from each and rejecting whatever did not seem to fit. His method then, was eclectic, and his purpose a philosophy which could support his theology[4] and provide the

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2Cf. F. Cayre, *Manual of Patrology* (Eng. trans. by H. Howitt. Paris: Desclee and Co., 1940. Printed in Belgium), vol. II. p. 778ff.

3*Ibid.*, p. 781.

4Cf. Julian Marias, "Francisco Suarez, His World, Mind and Method," *Dublin Review;* 221:115-30, Spring, 1948. p. 122-3.

Catholic position with a two-edged sword enabling it to engage in the religious and doctrinal controversies of the times.

As a seminarian, Suarez received his early philosophical and theological training at Salamanca where nominalism was taught side by side with Thomism, Scotism, and the other prevailing philosophies of the sixteenth century. At least one[5] of Suarez's teachers had at one time occupied the chair of Durandus, the forerunner of Ockam, the nominalist.

It was Durandus who held that the intellect knows the singular directly, that is, without the intermediacy of the sense image of the imagination. Now this same principle, which was one of the basic tenets of nominalism, had also been accepted by Suarez[6], at least by the time he began to write his *Disputationes Metaphysicae;* and if he was at all influenced by his early training at Salamanca—and this is very probable—Suarez could have maintained this principle even from the early beginnings of his scholarly career.[7]

Suarez was not a nominalist, for he saw that nominalism would destroy all science by destroying that property of the concept on which all true science depends, namely, its universality. There can be no science of the singular, but only of the universal. However, because he did maintain that the intellect can know the singular directly, Suarez had to be and was a conceptualist,[8] and this fact can also be inferred from the presupposition which pervaded and dominated his whole philosophy – the preservation of the unity of the concept of being.[9]

Conceptualism differs from nominalism insofar as it admits that the intellect can have truly universal concepts. These universal concepts, however, are formed by the mind, that is, mind-made, and there is nothing whatsoever in reality which corresponds to them. They are merely artifacts of the mind, useful in classifying and correlating different things for the purpose of their scientific investigation.

But why, precisely, was Suarez a conceptualist? For this reason: if, as he held, the intellect knows the singular, materially existing thing directly, then all our concepts of reality are as singular as the material beings from which they have been abstracted. Consequently, the uni-

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5Namely: Jean de Guerava. Cf. *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique,* tome 14, 2 partie, 2638, "Suarez" by P. Monnot.

6F. Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (Paris: *Opera Omnia,* edited by Louis Vives, 1856-1866. Tomi XXV et XXVI), disp. 6, sect. 6, n. 7, and *De Anima* (*Opera Omnia,* ed. L. Vives. 1856-66. Tomus III), libro 4, cap. 3, n. 9.

7Merechal is of the same opinion in his *Le point de depart de la metaphysique;* vol. I, p. 134, as cited by M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (Eng. trans, by Ernest C. Messenger, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1926.), vol. II, p. 305, footnote.

8Cf. F. X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* (Paris: Andreas Blot, editor, 1938.), tomus III, pars II, p. 27 and p. 58.

9For further amplification of this point, see "An Anomalous Analogy," by Damian Fandal in *Reality;* vol. I, pp. 130-5, Spring, 1951.

versal concepts which exist in our mind and which are the foundations of all our science could not have been abstracted from material singulars, but must, indeed, have been made by the mind and subsequently mentally superimposed over groups of similar singular concepts for their classification and scientific investigation. Therefore, these universal concepts represent not things as they are in reality, but simply other concepts which exist in the mind.

Certain significant conclusions logically follow from the principles of conceptualism if accepted as a theory of knowledge. To say that the intellect knows the singular directly is to say that the intellect knows *this existing essence.* In other words, the intellect not only knows the essence of the material singular directly, but its existence as well.

Now Thomists hold it is only by sense knowledge that we know the existence of a thing directly. Consequently, in attributing to the intellect a function of sense knowledge, the conceptualist is attributing sense and intellectual knowledge to one specific knowing faculty. But if knowledge is had by one specific faculty, then the intellect, in one and the same act, not only knows *what* a thing is — its essence — but also *that* it is — its existence — and from this it logically follows:

1) that the mind cannot conceive an actual essence apart from the concrete existence it has in reality, or in other words, actual essence and existence are as inseparable in the mind as they are in reality;[10]
2) that the real objects of our knowledge, in order to be knowable as such, must necessarily exist — have at least some minimal existence — in reality;[11]
3) that the singular existing thing, as it is conceived in the mind of the conceptualist, must always retain some vestige of its former concrete materiality, for if a material form is conceived as existing, it must necessarily be conceived as existing in matter;
4) that, as a consequence of conclusion 3), the conceptualist will never be able to extract himself from the purely physical order so as to reach the third degree of abstraction, because he can never completely abstract from all matter;[12]

10Actually, Suarez used this line of reasoning to prove the real identity of essence and existence. Cf. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 31, sect. 6, nn. 13, 14, 15, 23, 24; and Maquart; *op. cit.*, p. 87 (D)ff.

11Suarez held that even prime matter had a weak existence, *actus debilis.* Cf. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 15, sect. 9, n. 5, and Cayre, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 783 (d).

12Suarez seems to have been confronted with the same difficulty. Cf. Cayre, *op. cit.*, p. 782-1. To supply for this defect, Suarez had to have the mind make wholly immaterial concepts which could be superimposed over any group of similar material things for their classification and metaphysical analysis. Consequently, because his metaphysical universal was not the abstracted nature, but a mind-made representation of it, the objective concept in Suarez's theory of knowledge would not be that which we know, but merely an intentional representation of the nature of material things. (Cf. Maquart, *op. cit.*, p. 23-3. and p. 89 - d).

5) that, as a consequence, he must eventually destroy formal abstraction itself, by making the real *separation* of forms, and not *distinction* of forms the fundamental criterion for abstracting a metaphysical form from all matter.[13]

Finally, with conceptualism as its mode of operation, the mind is able to make its own universal concepts and those of almost anything imaginable. But how can the mind of the conceptualist be sure that this or that universal concept represents anything in reality? What criterion must the conceptualist have at his finger tips to prove that this mind-made concept represents more than just a figment of his own imagination — a being of reason? He must find its concrete, material, sensible, existing counterpart in reality. In other words, he must equate the *real* with the *actual.*

With these facts in mind, how do you think the conceptualist, in reading St. Thomas, would regard the concept of *prime matter* or *pure potentiality,* remembering that the *prime matter* of the Thomistic synthesis is essentially supersensible, a notion that is arrived at by a reasoning process that goes beyond the limits of sense experience?

He would have to reject it as *unreal,*[14] for although the mind can come to a knowledge of prime matter, as such and in its state of pure potentiality, it neither has nor can have an existing, sensible counterpart in reality, because of itself, it has no act, either formal or existential.

What has been said above with regard to Suarez's background, the reader is free to accept or reject, as it is in no way intended to be the last word on the matter. Actually, the problem proposed at the beginning of this article can be and is solved without recourse to Suarez's life or conceptualism. However, inasmuch as there is ever present the danger of any philosophical system appearing incongruous when analyzed in the light of the principles of an opposed synthesis, it is hoped that this brief historical sketch will serve as a sympathetic vantage point from which to view the following investigation of the principles of Suarezianism.

In his *Disputationes Metaphysicae,*[15] Suarez divides potency into two general classes according to the way in which the term *potency* can be applied. See Figure on P. 15.

Used in a quasi-negative way and called *logical potency,* it is applied to the notion of possible essence and implies a non-repugnance to existence. That possible essence is said to be a logical potency the essential notes of which are mutually compatable, or at least not contradictory. However, Suarez carefully notes at this point that the term *logical potency* cannot be applied to those potencies which consist in some simple and *real* faculty. Yet, if we disregard the fact that Suarez does

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13Suarez seems to have been forced to the same conclusion. Cf. Cayre, *loc cit.*
14*Ibid.,* p. 783 - c.
15*Op. cit.,* disp. 42, sect. 3, n. 9 and disp. 43, prologue.


Potency (Suarez)
Logical
Intrinsically
Possible (Logical)
in a strict sense
Extrinsically
Power of Acting
Substantial
Proximate
Uncreated
Principal
Remote
Created
Accidental
Proximate
Active
Actual
Potency (St. Thomas)
Possible by Positive Denomination
in a broad sense (Physical)
Capacity of Receiving
Substantial (in prime matter)
Pure (is prime matter)
?
Formal Act
Mixed
Accidental
Existing Substance
Passive

not consider a possible essence to be real (and we shall see the reason for this later when he equates the real and the *actual*), we can compare Suarez's notion of logical potency to a possible potency, in the Thomistic division, with regard to its intrinsic possibility.

Used by way of *positive denomination* and called *possible potency,* the term is applied to two distinct kinds of potency — to the first in a *strict* sense, to the second in a *broad* sense.

Taken in its strict sense, that may be called a possible potency by *positive denomination* which is able to be actuated by a capable agent. In this way, a possible essence is said to be *possible,* in the strict sense of that term, when there exists some agent or power capable of reducing it from the logical to the actual order, that is, of bringing it into actual existence. In Thomistic terminology, this corresponds to possible essence with regard to its extrinsic possibility.

It might be well to mention at this point that in the Thomistic tradition, a possible essence is spoken of as being *real* to distinguish it from a pure *being of reason.* A possible essence, even though it exists only in the mind, could nevertheless exist or have *actual* existence in reality, whereas a being of reason can never exist outside the mind and is, therefore, neither real nor actual.

Taken in its *broad sense,* the term potency is "denominated" of a real or (*seu*) physical faculty, which is of two kinds:

1) the *power of acting* or active potency, which is the principle of changing another inasmuch as it is other and is further subdivided into:
   a) *substantial,* and then it is either the *proximate* principle of acting in God, or the *principal* principle of acting in creatures, and this is their substantial form;
   b) *or accidental,* and then it is that proximate principle of acting in creatures with which the second species of predicamental quality is concerned, for example, the intellect, will, etc.,
2) the *capacity of receiving* or passive potency, which is the principle of being changed by another and is:
   a) either a *substantial* capacity for receiving a substantial form, and this is said to be *in* prime matter;
   b) or an *accidental* capacity for receiving accidental forms. In this way, an existing substance is said to have an accidental capacity or potency for receiving accidents.

Suarez considered his division of real potency into active and passive as adequate and sufficient.[16]

16*Ibid.,* disp. 43, sect. 1, n. 6.

We are not so much concerned with what Suarez did include in his division of potency, as with what he did not. You will notice that nowhere in this division is mention made of actual essence, *formal act,* and in fact, taking it in its strict Thomistic sense, there is no part of this division in which actual essence could be classified. It is excluded from both logical potency and potency by positive denomination in the strict sense, for they regard possible essence as to its intrinsic and extrinsic possibility. Nor could actual essence, which is a metaphysical potency, be classed with the real potencies, because Suarez has been careful to identify real with physical. Therefore, it seems that Suarez has excluded *actual essence* from the realm of potency.

Yet, we find elsewhere[17] in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* that he did speak of a metaphysical potency, but identified it with logical potency, that is, with a *possible essence.*

The conclusion, then, is that Suarez could admit of a *real* composition of potency and act only in the physical order, where prime matter and substantial form compose corporeal essence, because it is only there that he admits a real potential principle. Since Suarez admits no real composition of potency and act in the metaphysical order, he could admit no real composition of *actual essence* and *existence,* which are, respectively, a metaphysical potency and a metaphysical act. Now, then, let us draw this to its logical conclusion.

To say that there is no *real* composition of essence and existence (and we are using the term *real* here as Suarez would have used it), is to say that the essence of an actual existing being, does not have existence by reason of a distinct entitative act, and therefore it must have existence either by reason of itself or of its components. But no finite essence can have existence from itself, for then it would be the cause of its own being, which is impossible. Therefore, it must acquire its existence from its components.

Now the components of a corporeal essence are *matter* and *form.* But existence cannot come wholly from either matter or form, for then the component would exist as a distinct substance independently of the corporeal essence of which it is an essential part. Since every existing corporeal essence is of its very nature an *unum per se* — a principle to which Suarez readily agreed — it could not be composed of two or more independently existing substances. The only remaining possibility would be to say that the "total" existence of an actual essence comes partly from the form and partly from the matter, though neither has quite enough existence by itself to stand alone.

As a logical consequence, therefore, of his denial of a real composition of actual essence and existence, Suarez had to assign some partial

17 *Ibid.,* disp. 43, sect. 5, n. 12.

and weak act to prime matter. Not only did he attribute a proper act of existence to matter,[18] but went on to say that matter is not pure potency in the strict sense of the term,[19] that is, devoid of any act in any order.

Suarez maintained that prime matter is *pure potency* only insofar as it is in potency to the substanial form; only in that it is not a complete act — a complete being.[20] In itself, prime matter could not be a pure potency, because even previous to its union with a form it has some weak entitative act, some actuality; otherwise it would not be a real subject of the form. Suarez held that if matter is to be a *real* subject of the form it must of itself have *actual* being.[21] Thus, Suarez equates the *real* and the *actual order* by making what is real to be necessarily actual.

And so, whether one maintains as a philosophical principle that the intellect knows the singular directly or that there is no real composition of potency and act in the metaphysical order, he must in either case logically conclude to the exclusion of the notion of pure potentiality from his philosophical system. Stated more precisely, the denial of the actual composition of actual essence and existence is not so much a principle as it is a conclusion from the more primary premise that the intellect knows the singular directly, and of necessity, the notion of pure potency is logically rejected with equal force by both.

Potency, then, because it is a fundamental intrinsic principle of being, must necessarily be basic to any philosophy which would seek to find the ultimate explanation of reality. Yet, this notion of potency, as it was



18*Ibid.*, disp. 13, sect. 5, n. 9.
19*Ibid.*, n. 10.
20*Ibid.*, nn. 9 - 11.
21*Ibid.*, disp. 15, sect. 8, n. 7.

envisaged by Suarez, was not the intrinsic and distinct principle of imperfection which receives and limits act, but rather an act itself, not complete and perfect, but, nevertheless, a weak or *imperfect act.*

We come now to a determination of Suarez's notion of *act.* Is it, then, that principle of the perfection of being which St. Thomas considered it to be, or something else besides? (See Figure on P. 18.)

Act, as it is engendered in the Suarezian synthesis,[22] can be taken in two ways, *relatively* or *absolutely.* If taken *relatively,* then it is that act which is said to actuate a receptive potency — *passive potency* — in the way that form is the act of matter. This act is thereby called formal and is further subdivided into:

1) *physical* act, which is the physical form. This physical act, Suarez admits,[23] is really distinct from the potency which it actuates. For example, a substantial form is said to be the physical act of prime matter, from which it is really distinct;

2) *metaphysical* act, which includes:

   a) *act of essence,* such as a specific difference. Thus, a specific difference may be called an act of essence in that it can be considered as the more formal element in a species;

   b) *act of existence.* It is this metaphysical act of existence which Suarez attributes to prime matter in its "nascent" state,[24] that is, it is the *actus debilis* or imperfect act of existence which matter possesses of itself even apart from its union with a substantial form;

   c) the *mode of subsistence,* whereby an existing substance is able to subsist independently of other beings.

Suarez did not consider the metaphysical acts listed above to be really distinct from the receptive potencies which they actuate.[25] Consequently the *metaphysical act of existence* or the imperfect act — *actus debilis* — which he imputed to prime matter, is really identified with the matter itself. Thus, as was noted in Suarez's division of potency, prime matter is really an imperfect act — and not strictly a pure potency — in which there resides a *capacity of receiving* a further *physical act,* which is the substantial form.

Therefore, we must conclude that in place of the Thomistic notion of pure potency (or the really distinct principle of imperfection of finite beings intrinsically limiting a received act) Suarez substituted the notion of an imperfect or incomplete being. To this imperfect being could be added more being, and from the combination of two or more "partial"

22*Ibid.,* disp. 13, sect. 5, n. 8; and disp. 31, sect. 5, n. 15.
23*Ibid.,* disp. 43, sect. 5, n 13.
24*Ibid.,* disp. 13, sect. 5, n. 9.
25*Ibid.,* disp. 43, sect. 5, n. 12.

beings resulted a complete being. This conclusion will be more evident when we consider Suarez's notion of act taken absolutely, that is, considered in itself.

Moreover, because he regarded a metaphysical act as something actual and a metaphysical potency — possible essence — simply as a being of reason, Suarez would of course admit a real distinction between a metaphysical act and a metaphysical potency as between an existing and a non-existing being. However, it does not follow that he considered actual essence and its existence to be really distinct, for he in no way regarded an actually existing essence as a metaphysical potency. And since he identified actual essence and existence, he would not consider the existence of an actual and complete being to be a metaphysical act.

If taken *absolutely,* act is opposed to objective potency, because in itself it is something actual and not potential, although it actuates nothing else. In this way God is called act. This is *entitative* act and can be either:

1) act in an *unrestricted sense,* which is in the genus of being simply or (seu) in the genus of substance. This act is so complete that it is neither *constituted* by a physical act *distinct* from itself, nor does it need any further act in order to be. Act in its unrestricted sense is, according to Suarez, that *being,* which by reason of its own actuality includes that formal perfection *which other composed beings have through their substantial informing act.* Thus, while Suarez restricts this absoulte act in an unrestricted sense to the divine existence, he implies that the finite existence of a created essence is had by reason of its substantial form and not by reason of a distinct entitative act.

2) act in its *restricted* sense is that *being* which has some actuality, insofar as it is actually outside nothing, but it has this actuality so imperfectly and incompletely that it needs some other complementary act to give it "full" existence.

This "partial" and "weak" entitative act is no other than Suarez's prime matter. According to Suarez, this act in a restricted sense or formal metaphysical act of existence is prime matter's contribution of existence to the existing corporeal composite of matter and form.[26] Not admitting anything like a real potential principle, Suarez had to postulate this "partial" existence or be faced with Parmenides' Paradox.

Conspicuous in this division of Suarezian act is the absence of a distinct entitative act of existence proper to a created essence. The reason is, of course, that having identified essence and existence in creatures as well as in God, Suarez would include the act of existence of finite and

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26*Ibid.,* disp. 13, sect. 5, n. 9; and also disp. 13, sect. 4, n. 13.

"complete" beings under the category of *physical* act or the substantial form with which he identified it.

If existence, then, is not an act received and limited by a distinct potential principle — actual essence — how is it limited? Suarez's answer is that existence is unreceived, infinite, and unlimited in God because He has it of Himself; also unreceived, but finite and limited in creatures because they have it not of themselves, but of another, and this fact alone accounts for their limitation and finiteness, that is, their imperfection.

This formal physical act, then, which is at once the substantial form and also the very act of existence whereby that form exists, is limited in creatures not because it is received in a potency really distinct from itself, but because it is from another and not from itself. In other words, existential act is limited because created — because made that way by God.[27]

In summary, contrary to St. Thomas, Suarez holds, that prime matter — pure potency — possesses of itself an existence independent of form which God could conserve as such apart from the form,[28] and that existence can be composed of partial elements as is essence.[29]

The pertinent conclusions, then, from this analysis of Suarez's notions of potency and act are:

a) Potency is an imperfect act.

b) Created act is not so much a principle of being as it is a being in itself, though perhaps only a "partial" being.

c) Entitative finite act — existence — is identical with a finite potency — actual essence.

d) Potency and act are not *always* — and, therefore, not *necessarily* — distinct.

e) Entitative finite act is limited by an extrinsic, creative power and not by an intrinsic and distinct potential principle.

Let us recall the fundamental principle of all Thomistic philosophy. *Act of itself is unlimited, and if limited, it is so only because it is received in a potency really distinct from itself.*

Phrased (as nearly as possible) in the style of St. Thomas' principle, the Suarezian principle of the relationship of potency and act would have to be stated thus: act of itself is *not* unlimited, and as limited, it is so *not* because it is received in a potency really distinct from itself, but because it is created and identified with a finite potency.

27*Ibid.*, disp. 31, sect. 6, nn. 13, 14, 15.
28*Ibid.*, disp. 15, sect. 9, n. 5.
29*Ibid.*, disp. 13, sect. 4, n. 13.

It is manifestly evident that these two principles are not only different, but what is more, diverse and contradictory.

Therefore, there is contained in Suarezian philosophy a proposition contradictory to the fundamental principle of all Thomistic science.

Consequently, Thomism and Suarezianism are essentially irreconcilable, even to the extent of being intrinsically opposed.

By way of corollary, Thomistic science cannot coexist as a perfect intellectual habit together with the philosophy of Suarez.

This article would be incomplete without a few more words by way of clarification. To any who would object that Suarez never arrived at the true explanation of the basic intrinsic principles of reality, one might well reply by asking: was he looking for them? A rejection of his philosophy ought not imply a condemnation of its author. Suarez's laudable and noble search for truth was hampered by obstacles which have almost universally proved insurmountable.

In the first place, Saurez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* in which are condensed the principles used in his synthesis of the theologies of St. Thomas and Scotus, was not the logical outgrowth of an investigation of the philosophy of nature – a method of approach so necessary to a correct evaluation of the true notion of being. Not only did the praiseworthy task given him to synthesize the intrinsically opposed philosophies of St. Thomas and Scotus necessarily prove to be an impossible one, but it also precipitated a metaphysics which did not have as its natural approach the philosophy of nature. Moreover, the age of religious and political turmoil in which he lived and labored was not conducive to that quiet and serene investigation of the fundamental problems of philosophy for which the thirteenth century is so justly famous.

Even as in his own lifetime Suarez had expended every effort in the defense of the Church, who would doubt, that were he alive today he would again hearken to the call of Mother Church for greater intellectual unity? He was a man who would not be content merely to lay aside his own personal views. Like many of his courageous brethren, especially in America, he would embrace whole-mindedly that philosophy which Holy Church has recognized as alone holding the key to the solution of those most grievous problems of the twentieth century – the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Edward O'Connor, O.P.

THE PROTESTANT DEVELOPMENT

BECAUSE IT IS A BOOK ABOUT MEN and about the relationship between men and God, there is a sense in which the *Summa Theologiae* receives its most breath-taking commentary from the ordinary course of human events. If we want to know what real men have thought about the world in which they have found themselves, if we want to witness their reactions to that world and to follow the course of those reactions through until they culminate in their terms, we must rake through the remains of fires which, at one time or another, have actually been kindled and left to burn in the hearts of men.

At the beginning of the second part of the *Summa* Saint Thomas insists that the fractional happiness which men can acquire for themselves on this earth does not wholly resolve their problem, that there will always be the difficulty of the dark brown taste in the mouth the morning after, and that even though they conquer the whole world they will find it possible to sit weeping on a mountain top. In spite of this, when we allow our gaze to shift to the past we find history devoting an ever larger department to individuals and, at times, to whole peoples who have held the opposite opinion, who insist either like the Communists that heaven can be brought down to earth, or like certain of the Existentialists that heaven cannot *be* at all. Our own twentieth century is filled with such people. In our times we are confronted with the unique and terrifying phenomenon of a century which has moved further away from God than any before it in history. As Whittaker Chambers has put it: "It is the first century since life began when a decisive part of the most articulate section of mankind has not merely ceased to believe in God, but has deliberately rejected God." The fact scarcely any longer needs corroboration but a few remarks will help to highlight the important shadows which have been steadily creeping across our rapidly diminishing globe.

Our special concern is the non-Catholic in the United States, what he is like, and what can be done about him; but because the world is constantly and insistently being channeled into both his life and our

own through all the amazing media of modern communication, a detour is worth while. Our American non-Catholic's problem (and so our own), unlike that of his ancestors, literally encompasses the globe. Think, for instance, what he brings to bear on the problem of evil by a simple flick of his radio switch. He hasn't just one cyclone at his fingertips but a whole world in chaos. In his economic and political life the more than fifty years since the turn of the century, and especially the years since the advent of the first World War, have seen an ominous but inevitable swing from traditional American isolationist ideals to the realization of a necessary participation in European, and even Asian, affairs. In spite of himself the burden of the world has been yoked to his shoulders restating with a fresh and cosmic emphasis the truth contained in John Donne's ancient line:

No man is an Iland, intire of it self.

In Russia, then, the population of which roughly approximates two hundred million people, the government in power is officially and by definition committed to a militant atheism which it consistently and ruthlessly pursues wherever it extends its sway.

A similar situation has begun to emerge farther to the East. In China which represents some four hundred millions, the old family traditions, vested for centuries with the ethical and religious sanctions of Confucianism and of the Eastern religions, and which have played such an historic role in Chinese culture, were already being measured with a critical eye at the turn of the century against the luxuriously garbed ways being poured in from the West. The advent of Communism has only shaken them to their depths. As a matter of fact, all over the East the soil is being rooted up and it will never lie fallow again. It is a striking witness to what the scholastic axiom *voluntas tendit in rem apprehensam* can mean when it is placed in the world of men.

The European picture is by now an old question. With few exceptions Communism is a political factor which demands constant vigilance in all the major countries of the Continent.

In England, as in our own United States, the special problem is that of secularism in its dictionary sense—of the attempt to organize human life without any reference to God, either positive or negative. It is this attitude which the French Jesuit Pére DeLubac so excoriated when he wrote: "Man cannot organize the world for himself without God; without God he can only organize the world *against man.*"

But while the divorce itself is apparent and its consequences, especially in Europe, becoming more and more so every year, the roots of the new growth remain hidden from the general surface view of things in the deep, undisturbed soil of the past. Ever since the Protestant Reformation the peoples of Western Civilization have been undergoing a

constant shifting and reshifting of their allegiances, very much like Saint Paul's storm-tossed sailors who were driven before the wind of each new doctrine that human subtlety, human skill in fabricating lies, could propound. As Christopher Dawson has repeated with such insistency, the issue has been the destruction of the spiritual unity which first brought Europe into being in the Ages of Faith. The point is an important one.

A spiritual unity is one created by the concurrence of a number of individuals—in the present case those belonging to Western Civilization—in the things which they hold to be good. As a matter of fact Saint Augustine once defined society as "an assembly of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love."

It can be seen most clearly at its most basic level. You and I say that family living makes for human happiness. Sparta in ancient times, and the National Socialists and theoretical Communists of our own take the opposite view. Children, for example, ought to be raised by the state. You and I say that it is good for men to own a home and the clothes they wear. The Communist again regards this as one of the fundamental ills of society. You and I feel that we have definite obligations to respect the persons and rights of our fellows. Philosophers like Machiavelli and Rosenberg and dictators like Ghengis Khan and Hitler disagree.

For a short time, at least, medieval Christendom, from which all the present Western nationalities stem, achieved such a unity that the whole of Europe was pretty well agreed, at least in theory, on the distinction between good and evil. Even through the Protestant Revolt, for as long as Protestantism remained an effective moral force, some semblance of the original unity remained. Our own American Constitution is ample evidence of what earlier generations of Protestants thought about the distinction between right and wrong.

This, incidentally, at least partially explains the inability of the Church to make any noticeable progress against the Reformers until our own times, a point worth developing. There was already leaven in the lump, the wineskins were already filled, or whatever analogy you will. It was the very leaven which had been introduced at an earlier age by the Church, so that now on the other side of the fence but temporarily, at least, possessed of the same values, a dour and straightlaced Protestantism could look down its nose at the Church and feel sincerely that it was by Beelzebub that She cast out devils.

For Her part, the Church's attention was focused largely on a defense of the walls. So badly has she been shaken by the explosions of the sixteenth century that Her apologists were kept busy just loading their guns with *ad hominem* ammunition, and running to fill each new

breach as it appeared. Battle implements like the condemnation of Galileo, the chained Bible, and Alexander VI, demanded new techniques on the side of the defenders, and eventually were met with the sort of miniature religious encyclopedias we have in Father Conway's *Question Box* and the three volumes of *Radio Replies* by Rumble and Carty. If you want to understand the problem which faced the Church in this country in past generations, thumb through Cardinal Gibbon's *The Faith of Our Fathers* to see what the world thought of us. Its guns are lowered on a mentality hurled up in the Reformation, and which has only recently begun to disintegrate.

At the time of the Reformation, the main bodies of Protestantism in Europe, the Calvinists, the Lutherans, and the Anglicans, at first followed sketchily along the traditional patterns of organization set up by the Church in earlier centuries. Notwithstanding their overt disavowal of the Papacy and of all the visible paraphernalia of religion, the followers both of Luther and of Calvin, immersed in the mentality they had repudiated, set to work searching for new organs to invest with the castoff authority, and unconsciously laid the seal of religious sanction to the surging provincial forces which were soon to swell up and culminate in the creation of the parochial state.

So the reform was betrayed. There is no whistling down the wind to freedom and God. Within a hundred years the new churches had begun to mince under the sharp knives of internal dissension, and, as the Spirit stirred less and less, sensitive souls began to awake in horror to the unhealthy atmosphere feeling its way, like a cold fog, beneath the surface.

Then new prophets began to arise. Onto the stage of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, strode the gigantic reforming figures of George Fox and John Wesley. Both of them men mighty in the Spirit, Wesley, beginning at the age of thirty-six, travelled 225,000 miles and preached more than 40,000 sermons.

But there were also a host of less notable dissenters, and it was a group such as this which, in 1629, having fled across the North Atlantic, and up the New England coastline, slid peacefully into the June waters of Massachusetts Bay.

Unlike earlier English colonial experiments, which were essentially economic ventures of the parent country, the Puritains had brought with them their chief shareholders, and from the outset formed a fairly autonomous body. Believing that "God had sifted a whole nation that He might send choice grain into this wilderness," and that the harsh soil of the New England coast was to be "the place where the Lord will create a new Heaven and a new Earth," the little group quickly knit together a tight spiritual community, electing councils of elders,

legislating their church covenant, and listening to sermons preached on the religion of the Spirit.

Five hundred miles to the south, the Virginia colony at Chesapeake Bay, officially Anglican in religion, had begun to organize along somewhat looser lines, following the traditional patterns of the Anglican ministry.

The Middle colonies were to act as bond. Maryland, founded by the Catholic Lord Baltimore, and Rhode Island, founded by Roger Williams, a religious dissenter from the colony at Massachusets Bay, were the first officially to introduce Acts of religious toleration into the framework of their legislatures. This device, so facile an instrument of peace wherever divurgent currents suddenly find that they must henceforth run together, was to play a great part in the future development of the country.

But it was to the kindly William Penn and his colony of Friends in Pennsylvania that the great era of immigration was largely due. Reaching out behind the Appalachians and into the endless basin of the Mississippi, Penn's colony, which itself became a sanctuary for the persecuted of the world, afforded all the opportunities of a vast and unexplored continent. It was here, and in the other colonies which had access to the interior, that a new and distinctively un-European way of life was to appear. The colonists moved inwards, away equally from Europe and from the settled society of the coast, and their churches went with them.

Common interests in the struggle with the forests and lowlands, in the wars with the French and Indians, and finally in the Revolution, all served to stitch the tiny new communities tightly to one another and within these democratizing influences of the womb of the nation.

After the explosion of 1776, weary of war and death, more and more eyes began to shift to the West. At Charlotte, North Carolina, a thousand wagons were counted passing through in a single year. Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana were created during this period, and in the six years after 1812, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri further swelled the nation's roster. These ten new states, leveled socially by the harsh life of the frontier, and lacking the separatist ideals of the older creations on the coast, swung the nation's center inward, briefly straddling the Appalachian mountains, and finally coming to rest within the borders of the continent's great Central Plain. The nation, henceforward, would accept, and wear indelibly, the impress received from them.

Meanwhile, what was happening in the churches? For a short time, at least, all was optimism. After countless ages of time, a people had finally hearkened to the Heavenly voice which spoke to them from above,

and in a land flowing with abundance, were, at long last, being led to eat of the good things of the earth. By the Forties the vision of "a new heaven and a new earth," phophesied two centuries earlier on the Upper Atlantic coast, seemed to be rapidly becoming a reality. Manifest Destiny had spoken, and God was on the march.

Plausible speculation on the setting of the Northern boundary at 54°40′ spurred the imagination on to new heights. Was it, after all, too preposterous to dream of a single united people extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, and from Canada through Mexico to Central or South America—even as far as Cape Horn? Even then the good things of the earth were not yet exhausted. The last year of the decade would see the human avalanche up over the Rockies and crashing deliriously down the western slopes of the Sierras to tear from the California soil the treasure which lay buried there. But the end was around the corner.

When the country went to war with herself, her sons, steeped in the new American tradition, marching erect through sunlit forests where their forebears had felled the trees, carried on their lips in Julia Ward Howe's *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, a powerful and perfect expression of all that lay in the deepest wellsprings of their being:

> *Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord. . .*
> *He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat;*
> *He is sifting out the hearts of men before his judgment-seat;*
> *O, be swift, my soul, to answer him: be jubilant my feet!*
> *Our God is marching on.*

In this crisis of adolescence—in the sudden stunning vision of well over half a million horrifying human deaths sweeping aside forever the dreams of childhood, in the wild delirium of victory and manic depression of defeat, finally, in the dark realization of the possible profits to be acquired in the exploitation of the vanquished—the country awoke, in the space of four short years, both to the extremities of human passion, and to the possibilities of sin.

The churches, correspondingly, began to change. As the era of Big Business opened up, with its trusts and monopolies, the frontier began to settle down, and the churches too began replacing their old wooden structures with new ones of stone, adjusting themselves to the demands of the rising new American Middle Class. The final flood of European immigrants poured unlimited quantities of cheap labor onto the scene. Axe and rifle gave way to to pick and shovel. The railroads brought Chicago into being.

In its turn, the new heterogeneous mass (including large numbers of Catholics from Ireland and Germany) further provoked the troubled religious notions of the older generation, deciding their inevitable extinction. Swamped with mentalities foreign to their own, the manufacturing centers on the East coast knew that life must, nevertheless, go

on. As before, the principle of toleration was pushed forward to solve the difficulty.

More and more conspicuously, the absence of any authoritative agency to stay the subtle dissolving properties of private interpretation was having its effect. It had been at work already in the Old World but, because of the institutional character of the main European churches, had been less apparent. Now, in the New World, the interplay between parent churches and the numerous sects of dissenters took on new dimensions. In the aphorism of Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, "the sects in America tended to become churches and the churches to become sects." The latter, filled with enthusiasm and seeking always a new way of life, tended to shun the settled areas, and were for pushing out into the frontier where America was in the making. Gradually a new American kind of Protestantism came into being, a blur of church and sect, of institutionalism and enthusiasm, still bearing the "do-gooding" characteristics it had acquired on the frontier.

The reshuffling also had another effect. With the coming of the powerful, new economic forces in society, the Protestant clergy, whose livelihood hinged upon their personal ability to capture and command their flocks, found themselves in the hands of a material minded laity. This, in addition to the pressure of the denominations, which thrust its wedges between parent and splinter churches, between Methodists and Reformed Methodists, or between Baptists and Hard Shell or General Six Principle Baptists, gave to American Protestantism its special stamp of weakness: secularism. And secularism is death to religion.

The process continued with minor variations through the fifty odd years after the Civil War, until in the era surrounding World War I, America stood in the hallway of the great Jazz Age. The good and devout, with the spontaneous and uncritical conservatism of the great bulk of mankind, held hard to the old ways, watching with misgivings as the youth of the country rocked emptily to the nervous tempo of the latest unprecedented rage. More and more pent up in a world which was now quickly coming to be hermetically sealed, even within themselves, Americans craved new outlets for their energies, and with nothing else in view, found them in gin and "whoopee"; while the most neurotic element of society, which represents not a cross-section but a thin layer of sediment sliced from the bottom of humanity, sought out its solace in the wild loneliness of a wailing saxophone.

Saint Augustine, describing the influence exercised upon him by Saint Ambrose in his own worldly youth, remarks in his *Confessions*, "I came to love him, not at first as a teacher of the truth which I had utterly despaired of finding in your Church, *but for his kindness to me.*" There is a level at which our mental pronouncements on the nature of reality shut off, and the fundamental needs of the human spirit take over

and demand, even bellow, for their own well-being. As the tension in us mounts we become our own implacable enemies. *Non in rebus creatis,* insists Saint Thomas. If we listen closely there is, in our own times, at least a faint echo of this to be heard in the messages of men like convert Thomas Merton and Quaker Whittaker Chambers, who plead with us to stop being what we are not and to become what we are. Secularism violates humanity; and sooner or later a man in pain will scream.

Holed up at Corinth for the winter when the seas were un-navigable, Saint Paul, fresh from the heat of argument with the worldly-minded Greeks, pleaded by mail with the Christian community at Rome: "You must not fall in with the manners of this world; there must be an *inward* change, a remaking of your minds, so that you can satisfy yourselves what is God's will, the good thing, the desirable thing, the perfect thing."[1] There must be an inward change. You must become what you are.

Already in the last century, at the very time when a more articulate European secularism had reached its romantic heyday among the intellectuals, even before a Nietzsche had begun trumpeting abroad his doctrine of "Nothing but the earth!", Soren Kierkegaard, a somber Danish Protestant theologian, had called into question the wisdom of the age. Whatever their reasons, the authors have referred to him many times as the theologian of inwardness.

In recent years Chinese convert John Wu, in his book *Beyond East and West,* has realized that the problem of expansion which man now faces is no longer one of movement eastward or westward, but of movement inward.

Anglican poet T. S. Eliot, in his cryptic, probing manner, had already expressed as much in the second of his *Four Quartets:*

> *Here and there does not matter*
> *We must be still and still moving*
> *Into another intensity*

Finally (and significantly), the fact that it has long been outlawed by some scholars of his discipline, has not prevented the Protestant historian Arnold Toynbee from terminating his inquiries with the mental action of judgment. Good and evil are distinct. In his *A Study of History,* he concludes that the continued development of a civilization, once the problems of geographical expansion and of the conquest of environment have been solved, hinges upon its direction "from the field of external environment, physical or human, to the *for intérieur* of the growing civilization."

What is all this but the beginning of a recognition of the fact that the old leaven has been purged out, that the old values are gone, and

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1Romans 12:2, Knox

that new ones must be sought to fill the vacuum?[2] If the high tide of materialism is over the earth, if a few articulate individuals have sensed the danger and cried out to their fellows in distress, what Way will find their eyes when they, at last, have come to look for it? If it is to be the Church, and we believe that it will be, how are they to be brought to recognize Her for what She is?

The spade work lies very close to home. Man is a rational animal. In spite of himself he cannot cease to be what he is for very long, and when the truth is requested, it must be found to be available. Father Gerald Vann has said:

> "If we are to return to sanity it must be through the return of the intellect to its fundamental purposes, to wonder, adoration, vision, wisdom, all of which can spring only from humility and *inwardness*."

But there is a still more common plane upon which one man meets another. Saint Paul harped at it throughout his life, and nearly two centuries later it formed the proud boast which Minucius Felix flung up at his opponents as the final apologetic:

> *Non eloquimur magna, sed vivimus!*

Her *marks* are visible marks. Interesting though a blueprint may be to them, it is a Holy Temple men look to for shelter, and charity builds the house. Catholicism, emphatically, must be seen not simply as a philosophy but as a Way of Life.

Are there any signs of the times? Faint, certainly, but they are there. The annual tabulation of converts, which apologists and statisticians insist is about as significant as a paper pellet shot from a toy gun, but which is, nonetheless, blurted across the headlines of diocesan weeklies once a year, may be taken for what it is worth. More significant, though less susceptible of mathematical analysis, is the current awareness of the power of the Church. It is certainly true, notwithstanding what some of our well-meaning apologists have had to say to the contrary, that the Church is a powerful factor in American life. Any minority group is. But what accentuates it in the eyes of our non-Catholic neighbors is not so much any great increase of power on her own part, as it is the dissolution of any of the effective moral forces which formerly surrounded her. Areas of human conduct traditionally located within the framework of religion, and now eager to be rid of the old norms, have come to look for sanction in civil legislation, with its greater appreciation of public pressure. And, of course, Catholic morality does not bend.

2In some statistics recently published by the National Council of Churches, it was announced that Protestants now represent 34.7% of the population, Catholics 19.3%. Catholics accustomed to rigid census demands which always set church membership at its lowest, should bear in mind the traditional glow to Protestant figures. One minister recently stigmatized it as "the chuckling matter of the churches." Thus, at best, lumped Protestantism (forgetting its sectarian divisions) represents the largest minority group in a country 65.3% of which is not Protestant. We have come a long way in one hundred and seventy-seven years.

In other words, it is a fresh emphasis being laid to the meaning of two of the visible marks of the Church, to her Unity and to her Catholicity. The light being thrown upon her Unity is a particularly bright one.

While this new emphasis has brought Mr. Blanchard down on us, it has, at the same time, unbandaged the eyes of many others to a better view of the Church for what she is. That Americans are deeply and sincerely concerned over the slip between their ideals of democratic government and the reality, can no longer be questioned. After the last national election, when President Eisenhower rode into the White House on the greatest political landslide in the history of the country, splitting traditional party politics through its middle, the Kiplinger News Agency set itself the task of finding out why. At the term of its inquiries it had listened to a lot of admittedly confused talk and muddy thinking, but if any one note predominated in the attitude of Americans to the course currently being steered in governmental politics, it could be summed up in a single word: irreligious.

Concomitantly, Catholic Unity, which they now see as powerful, they are also coming to see as Holy. "I will admit that the Catholic Church does do a lot of *good* in the world."

Her last mark brings us to ourselves. The Church is Apostolic. There is very little room for doubt about this on the part of Protestants. The Church's missionary activity is there for the record, and if irritating to some, there are others who will tell you that they are sincerely envious of her zeal.

What about ourselves? The general methodological question of techniques to be employed in the approach to the non-Catholic is largely a matter of tradition, of personal initiative, of discretion, and above all, of compliance in the dictates of authority. Are television, radio, street preaching, and so on *ad infinitum* suitable vehicles of Divine Truth? With an eye, always, to the above mentioned, of course they are.

Bishop Sheen has listed three rules for the observation of priests in contacting prospective converts, but they are equally applicable to Catholics at large. All three of them are kindness. For the non-Catholic the Church is summed up in you. It is Augustine and Ambrose all over again. "I came to love him for his kindness to me."

Though it would be useless to spin through every phase of the American apostolate, two of them, at least, by reason of their proximity, certainly have to be mentioned.

Close to home, our own indirect but immensely important work begun at River Forest in the summer of 1952, has already gained an initial confirmation in the response to its first invitations. American Catholicism, as it settles down from the furious activity of keeping pace with a nation in birth, swinging its energies further inward towards its

own center, is just beginning to turn its taproots down towards the really deep things of the Spirit. The new *Spiritual Institute for Priests and Religious,* designed to work centrifugally outwards from the clergy, was conceived as a means of guiding the rising interest of American Catholics in the deeper life of the Church through the channels of traditional spiritual theology.

Modern science, wonderful thing that it really is, so sacred yet so frightening to the world of the twentieth century, must be shown not that it is a monster, but on the contrary, that it is a vehicle which can lead men to the frontier of the Absolute. The stupendous task which the *Albertus Magnus Lyceum* has cut out for itself (one member has insisted that it *could* only be accomplished through supernatural motivation) is leveled at the fundamental condition of human knowledge, and for this reason, at the possibility of re-assessing the worth of the human spirit—thus, once again, at the condition of movement inwards.

Finally, what can we do? We have indicated in as general a way as possible, something of what our fellow Americans are like, how they got that way, and what is being done about it. But generalities, necessary as they are to a true picture, must always ultimately retain an annoying vagueness about them, and the problem always remains, what can *we* do?

Bishop Sheen who, as a New York cab driver put it, "talks about those big things so even a little guy like me can understand them," has suggested an answer. "Our times are no longer concerned with the Problem of Man, but with Man as a problem. That is why the *Prima Secunda* of the *Summa* of Saint Thomas is the key to the apologetics of the future."

Andrew Miehls, O.P.

THE ARTISTRY OF A TEACHER

THE TEACHER IS AN ARTIST in ideas. He helps to create the vision of truth in the mind of another man. Other artists, working in stone, paints, or with words alone, gain a measure of control over their material; but the teacher is in a peculiar position, for he is working with another free agent. He cannot force truth into the mind of another. He cannot ignore or destroy the freedom of his subject; he must work with it.

The teacher, then, cannot carve out ideas in the mind of another like a woodcarver. He must be a combination of scholar, animal trainer, and artist. His art is further complicated by a great complexity of matter – many human beings with varying personalities and capabilities, and the inherent differences in sciences and disciplines.

Likewise, few other arts make a demand upon the artist as does teaching. Intellectually, the teacher must be a man of wisdom, and morally, he must be well developed in virtue. In the actual practice of his art he must have a high degree of intuition to see the condition of the matter he is working with, and he needs great skill and dexterity in selecting and using his instruments, words.

However, of all the things a person can do for his fellow men, the greatest is to instruct them in truth since this is the highest of the spritual works of mercy. Few men have not cried out at some time in their lives: "God, (some have added, "if there be a God,") that I may see!" God has raised up from among men, teachers to show them the truth; they are the ordinary channels through which His Wisdom is revealed.

The twentieth-century world offers the most widespread opportunities for showing men the truth. Besides practically universal education, a hundred types of written and audial media reach out to people to instruct them. In former times only Utopian poets dreamed of a situation where almost every person could receive a high school education, and where hundreds of thousands would attend universities.

Still, men often fail despite the greatest opportunities. If there were a "doctor of intellects" to test the results of education upon men at the highest level of education, the students of universities, he would find that many are suffering an acute case of mental indigestion. Day after day they are filled with facts, theories and assorted truths, yet they do not assimilate them.

Grave consequences follow: students develop into passive sponges; their original childlike desire to know is frustrated and lost. They grow little in their ability to see things properly and to judge rightly; what they know, they know superficially. In a word, their higher faculties are not developed and they leave the search for truth to others. They become the newspaper readers who choose their opinions like they do their neckties — whatever pleases them.

Two reasons for this condition stand out especially: the lack of the vision of the whole, that is, wisdom, and the ignorance or neglect of the proper artistry of the teacher. Wisdom brings integration and with integration the possibility of assimilation. It is because facts and truth are unrelated and because the underlying principles are not taught, that students' minds are a crazy quilt of hazy ideas. Likewise, when truth is ill-taught, there is no assimilation. It is on this latter point that an answer will be attempted.

Teaching is a difficult art, and consequently there are many disagreements about what the teacher is supposed to do. The fly-by-the-seat-of-your-pants school of common sense follows its own inclinations, and as a result some become storytellers and actors. Others read from their notes and their students write everything down without a thought passing through the mind of either teacher or student.

Others construct their own philosophy or use the currently popular theories of psychology. So there are classical idealists who attempt to shake loose the innate ideas already in the student's mind. Their cousins, the modern idealists, help the student to find himself "as an integral part of the universe of mind." The popular pragmatic school has a wide variety of schemes for helping students since they have *exclusively* adapted "practical" criteria.

The "Sunday-supplement" psychologists look upon the student as a higher animal and use various devices to stimulate a learning response from him. Also there are some educators who are not at all sure what the teacher's job is, and it has been reported that professors at a highly-regarded university seriously discussed whether the teacher had to know more than the student.

Such are the common opinions prevalent today. Nevertheless, despite all this confusion, a certain answer can be given, provided right principles are followed. The principles must come from philosophy, and especially

from psychology and logic, since the question is one of the nature of man and the right method to truth.

Proceeding in order, there should first be the question of the teacher's need. Men, subject to pride and sloth, may not like to submit to the discipline of a teacher, but no thinking man would deny his need. For, if a man were to wave aside the assistance of a teacher, he would run up against almost insurmountable obstacles in trying to know truths which were above his ordinary experience. The presence of the teacher is most fundamental in life and the natural law imposes upon the father of a family the radical obligation of educating his children.

Though men agree to the need for the teacher, it is not so evident what the exact nature of teaching is. It is, first of all, an art: the art of communicating truth to the mind of another. Being a scholar, then, by no means makes a man a teacher. He must have knowledge but he needs an art to communicate it. He must be articulate.

The end of the teacher-artist is that another man see the truth. The question is how can truth be caused in the mind of another. The artist has to stand back and see how the form can be brought about in the matter. The real starting-point, then, is to investigate the intellect.

Man, the subject of education, is a body-spirit endowed with intellectual, volitional, and sensitive powers. He first begins to know by perceiving the world with his external and internal senses. Of particular importance to the functioning of the intellect are the imagination and memory which furnish the raw materials for thought. The job is to produce and to recall images. The first condition of the intellect, then, from the teacher's point-of-view, is that it can be reached only through the senses and the image.

Between the image and the passive intellect there is, however, a wide chasm. The active intellect bridges this gap and starts the passive intellect to work. Under the First Mover, the active or agent intellect is the efficient cause of knowledge. A man, then, has two "intellects"—the active, by which he converts the raw materials of sensation into fit matter for intellectual thought, and the passive, in which he contemplates the refined matter and begins to form ideas.

In the first case, it is by the *activity* of the mind that the raw materials of sense experience are brought to the intellectual level. In the second, it is by the *receptivity* of the mind that ideas can be formed, worked over, coordinated, affirmed, denied.

This is the most basic principle, psychologically speaking, for the teacher to bear in mind; and it is the second condition of the intellect—the mind of man is in *active potentiality* to knowledge. In other words, knowing is the self-active process of a mind which at the beginning has everything to learn. Men's minds are neither purely passive nor totally

active: ideas cannot be poured into listeners nor can students be turned loose in the world as though their minds were wholly active powers.

A closer look reveals that this potency of the mind must be actuated gradually. There are several reasons for this: 1) Man is forced to work on the meager material presented him in the image; 2) he can only know one thing at a time; 3) what he knows, he knows imperfectly, for he falters in his penetration of essences; 4) he must proceed by steps: apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. Hence, the third condition is that he learn gradually.

Furthermore, he has to judge for himself what is true. This is not to say that he can withhold assent from what is certain; rather it is to emphasize that man is a *free* agent and likewise that his learning is a *personal* business. This is the fourth condition of the intellect.

And finally it must be remembered that knowing is a *natural* process. The plan for learning already has been marked out by nature and so the teacher must follow this plan as a guide for his artistry.

The true answer to what the teacher is, it was stated, would be found basically in the nature of man's knowing. And this is the self-active, gradual, free, and natural process of a body-spirit.

Educational policy-makers, intent on material progress at any cost, are oblivious of these principles of the intellect's seeing the truth. They feel that so much matter must be covered in so much time, and force teachers to race on, dragging the students behind them. Having forgotten that learning is a self-active process, they try to pour ideas into students, but the natural consequences are intellectual cramps and confusion.

If learning is a self-active business, where does the teacher fit in? For that matter, can't those with better equipment do without a teacher and learn from their own experience? The question must be answered in the context of man's present condition. True, the student is the one who learns, but in the providence of God, the way for men to acquire significant truths, the answers to the deep problems of life, is through the instruction of another. He can discover a few difficult truths for himself, but this is the rare exception. Considering the difficulties involved, the teacher is *absolutely* necessary for the acquisition of perfect knowledge.

The teacher is an artist, and, thus, an inspection of the act of teaching will reveal exactly what he is. In its barest outline this act is the communication of knowledge from a person who knows something to one who is ignorant.

The teacher, in the strictest sense, knows the principles and the conclusions, while the student knows only the first principles and is still in potency to knowing the conclusions. By manifesting the connection

between principles and conclusions, the teacher leads the student from a potential to an actual knowledge.

Hence, *teaching and learning are one act,* beginning with knowledge in the teacher's mind and ending with the same knowledge in the mind of the student. It is one act because there is one form, the same idea. The act "fails," or is imperfect if either agent fails—if the teacher limps in his artistry, in communicating the idea, or the student falters at his goal. The whole process must be a cooperative venture. This is the first principle of teaching and learning.

As has been said, the agent intellect of the student is the efficient cause of new knowledge. What then, is the role of the teacher in education? Since the teacher has actual knowledge of the conclusions and the student only potential knowledge of the same conclusions, the teacher is a true secondary cause. His efficiency is inadequate and extrinsic, while on the other hand the student's mind is the adequate and intrinsic cause. Moreover, under ordinary circumstances, the student absolutely needs the teacher if he desires perfect or significant knowldge.

The work of the doctor of medicine somewhat illustrates the causality of the teacher. The doctor, as Saint Thomas points out, *ministers to nature.* He does this by abetting nature and by applying the medicines which nature uses as instruments for healing.

The teacher's ministry to nature must be more than that of the doctor. While the doctor does not have to be healthy himself in order to cure a patient, the teacher, the master, must have knowledge *in actu.* His knowledge forms the exemplar or model of the student's new knowledge; it is the plan from which the teacher, as an artist-communicator, works to help "create" science in the mind of the student.

This plan of the teacher must be perfect if the art-work is to be successful. It is not a question of merely being familiar with a subject; rather, the teacher must have perfect knowledge, for he must have in himself everything that is caused in the effect. Saint Thomas remarks that the student's newly acquired science is "a copy of the teacher's." In the *Summa* he points out the specific requirements of the exemplar: 1) to be certain of the principles; 2) to know the principal conclusions; 3) to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects in order at times to manifest causes; and 4) to be able to confirm or prove what he says, or otherwise his words would have no weight.

Although the student must subject himself to the master so that his mind will be formed by the same knowledge as the teacher has, nevertheless, for complete balance, it must not be forgotten that the student is *free* and *self-active.* He must come to know and to judge the truth for himself. At the same time he must be shielded from error.

In assisting the student to know and to judge for himself, the teacher helps in character formation for he helps him reach intellectual maturity and a certain independence. To attain this maturity of thought, the proper balance of freedom with docility must be attained.

The teacher who expects complete subservience errs gravely for he puts himself in the place of God. The Divine Master alone is the absolute Teacher because He teaches interiorly and principally. He has given man the potencies to know and has impressed a likeness of His uncreated Truth in man's intellect.

Thus, from a loftier viewpoint, the teacher is an instrument in relation to God. Under God teaching and learning are a cooperative venture. The Irish, with their gift of expression, speak of the teacher as a foster-father and the student as a foster-child.

The nature and relationship of teacher and student have been spoken of, but the precise exercise of the artistry itself was only hinted at. Teaching is an art and in this capacity will imitate nature. The teacher ministers to the natural light of reason and in doing so must follow the *order* which nature imposes.

The student, left to himself, would proceed step by step from what he knows to what is yet unknown. He would also advance from the naturally known first principles to the conclusions that follow from them. So too, the teacher leads the student from the known to the unknown. He will guide the student from principles to the most general conclusions and finally to the particular conclusions, just as the student would do if he had the difficult task of attempting to discover these things for himself. In this way artistic order of teaching or discipline follows the natural order of discovery.

In the act of teaching, just as there are two agents, there must be two principles: the exterior principle, the knowledge of the teacher, and the interior principle, the power to know in the student. The student must have more than a few brain cells in order to have the power to know, because he must have naturally grasped the universal first principles and also the first principles of the particular science. The first principles can only be seen by intuition, and consequently the teacher's job at this point is to help the student experience the terms so that he can make an immediate judgment. After enabling him to see the principles, the teacher can concentrate on his real task, leading his student to the knowledge of conclusions.

In either case of helping the student to see principles or conclusions, the teacher uses what the student already knows, and by means of examples, contrasts, similitudes, and common principles, aids him in understanding the yet unknown principles and conclusions. This is the only way to begin. Everything else is literally beyond the student.

More important than leading him to conclusions, the teacher strengthens the student's mind. This he does by showing the order among the various principles and conclusions. Man has the weakest of intelligences and must proceed step by step since he does not see immediately everything that is contained in the principles as do the angels.

In the actual practice of teaching, the first thing the teacher must do is gain the student's good-will. Although teaching may be spoken of in terms of efficient causality, nevertheless, considering the whole man, the will is the real mover in learning. The importance of the will cannot be overestimated. A man must desire to learn, or he will turn his mind to something else.

The mind is able to concentrate its attention intensively only for a few seconds. Learning is often a tedious business and has little sensible pleasure connected with it. The will is inclined to easier and more pleasurable goods. Often psychological barriers have been built up against learning. All of these difficulties work powerfully to distract the mind from learning and the will needs added power, the virtue of docility, to give constant attention and honor to the teacher. Reasonable docility, however, can only be paid to those whose excellence in learning merits such respect.

Besides having excellence in learning, the teacher must gain the student's good-will by pointing out to him the value of the knowledge in question.

The teacher's next duty is to properly dispose the pupil's mind for learning. He does this by explaining the plans and divisions of the subject, for the student must have a general picture of the whole to keep the various parts in order as they are treated individually.

Finally, in introducing the student to the subject, the teacher must win his attention. Once convinced of the value, the student will become attentive when his mind is confronted with difficulties which he himself is to solve.

These three steps fall under the teacher's job of pre-disposing the student for the real work of learning. Throughout his teaching career, the instructor must have constant regard for the proper disposition of the student's mind and will because teaching, like any action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the recipient. The basic principle, once again, is that teaching and learning are one act, and, consequently, when the student is indisposed, teaching fails.

When he takes up the individual points, the instructor can best begin by presenting the student with a problem so that there will be some stimulation to reflection. By doing this, the teacher imitates the natural order which his student would follow if he were to venture forth alone on the path of knowledge. To be effective, this problem

must be presented in a specific and personal way so that the student will make it his own.

By presenting the problem and the conflicting views about it, the teacher creates a desire in the student for an authoritative answer. This must then be presented in an orderly and clear manner so that understanding and judgment of the truth or certitude can be obtained.

The student, on his part, must at first accept on faith what the teacher says because the ideas of the teacher, who leads him from the known to the unknown, are at first above his understanding. After thorough teaching, the student will be able to understand for himself. In other words, the impressions of the agent-teacher are proper to the subject-student only in terms of the action, which is understanding.

The real artistry of the teacher comes from his use of words. These are the all-important medium between minds; they are his artistic instruments. His words are the signs of his ideas and must be faithfully chosen to represent what is in his mind. At the same time, these signs, *signa significativa,* are the instruments and exemplar cause of knowing in the student, and, to fulfill this role, must be well adapted to his understanding. Hence, there is a twofold criterion for the teacher in his choice of words—*exactness* in representing his thought and *simplicity* to ease the burden of understanding.

The imparting of this knowledge rests in the ability to communicate exactly and simply, yet in an interesting way, for the wavering attention of the student will be directed to things which most interest him. Consequently, a teacher with an abiding interest and love of his subject should be able to hold the attention.

In retrospect, it can be seen that teaching and learning mean co-operation, one leading and the other actively following. It is one action beginning with the teacher imparting something of himself, his own ideas through his words, and ending in the student's possession of knowledge. The teacher will minister to the God-given powers of the student, yet the student must remain subordinated to the master who will point out the way to truth, the way he has already travelled.

For the venture to be successful, the student must readily follow with docility and credence. The teacher, on the other hand, must properly dispose the student and follow the order nature has imposed for learning. The journey will be gauged by the abilities of the student, and its progress judged by his acquisition of knowledge and truth.

God has given the teacher a great grace—helping other men to see. It is the most direct part a man can play in the divine government. But God also reminds him through Saint James: "Let not many among you, my dear brethren, become teachers, knowing you will receive the greater judgment."

James Cleary, O.P.

PATRIOTISM AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

INTERNATIONAL PEACE, as it is directly related to the common good, is a problem that is, at least in some degree, familiar to all of us. Ultimately it is the problem not only of attaining international peace, but also of maintaining it. For the latter aspect has been the chief source of discord among modern nations. Less remotely, however, it is the problem of the role which our own United States will have to play, if it is successfully to carry the burden of world leadership which the events of the last fifty years have laid upon its shoulders. Immediately it is the problem which the individual faces in all this.

As an American and a citizen of the United States, the individual has both rights and duties. To safeguard his rights he must first of all know what they are and what he must do to enjoy them. He must will to fulfill his duties. The latter problem rests squarely upon his own shoulders and is his to wrestle with as he can. But the former, the knowledge required of him, because knowledge is communicable, can be handed on to him from others.

This article, then, will try to supply the general principles necessary to guide the individual in solving the following problem: Is it unpatriotic for a man to support a trend towards world government? The existence of the virtue of patriotism has been very decidely demonstrated during the past two generations. It remains only to direct its activities into channels that will produce the best result.

> There is an international community of nations. God Himself has made the nations interdependent for their full life and growth.[1]

Lest we become guilty of laboring the obvious, we will but briefly treat of this point. It is commonly known that great efforts are being made to develop some form of international organization which can

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1Statement by the American Hieararchy on the conditions of peace, "Bishops, Statement on Peace," *The Catholic Mind, XLIII* (January, 1945), p. 2.

lawfully and equitably handle the problems arising from our present community of nations. This, of course, is not a new thing. We know from history that political philosophers have always seen the possibility of such a development. In ancient times the Romans were the most successful in realizing this goal. In the middle ages the Holy Roman Empire was a somwhat less successful attempt to reproduce the pagan structure in a Christian form and based on a wider geographical field. With modern and contemporary attempts toward world domination we are all too familiar.

Modern conditions of economic, political, and social life are making it increasingly impossible for a nation to grow and develop as an isolated unit, or even with only unilateral ties with other nations. The world of today is certainly much smaller than that of a hundred, or even of fifty years ago. Scientific advances of all types, particularly in the fields of communication and transportation, have led directly to a greater interdependence of all the nations. The contributions of science are so significant that for the first time one can now say that it is functionally feasible for one man to head a world government.

Further indications of the growing interdependence of the nations is strikingly furnished by the very large number of international associations. One catalogue of them now includes practically every conceivable field of human activity; and they are especially numerous in the field of economic and trade agreements. During the few short intervals of peace in the last fifty years, such agreements as these have so closely tied most major nations together that the individual economy of a single nation has been made operationally dependent in many respects on that of several other nations. Thus, when two nations declare war on each other, for what may at first seem to be an incident of local importance, the end result is that in a few weeks the entire globe becomes involved. The two World Wars are prime examples of this economic and political interdependence acting as direct causes of global war.[2]

These factors were most recently exemplified in Korea. Certainly every major nation, and nearly all the minor nations were engaged in this dispute. And although the actual fighting was confined to the boundaries of Korea, every nation so involved was known to be in the democratic or communist camp. No one, then, but the most ostrich-like isolationist will deny the trend toward at least a greater cooperation on an international scale in those matters which are of mutual interest to the countries concerned.

No one questions the fact of this trend, but the pertinence to it of the question we have raised still requires clarification. Just how is patriotism to fit into the picture? The value of the question is vividly illustrated

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2Francis J. Haas, *Man and Society,* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1930), pp. 262-267.

by contemporaneous events. In particular, we know that the efforts of the United States to solve our common problems on an international basis has often met with determined opposition. Frequently the most voluble members of this opposition attempt to clothe their actions in the becoming dress of a fervent patriotism. We maintain that their actions are forcefully indicative of at least a confused knowledge of the true role of the virtue of patriotism.

In all opposition of this type to international cooperation there are two common elements. First, the persons involved fear that a stronger and more thorough sense of internationalism is something that is harmful for them. Secondly, they attempt, in the role of vigilant patriots, to negate this cause of their fears by vigorously asserting the rights and glories of their own nation. Consequently, they show themselves immersed in a twofold error. By their fear of internationalism they expose their ignorance of the true goal of human life, and of the function of the state in helping us to attain that goal. By their attempts to rally against their supposed foe under the banner of patriotism they are actually harming rather than benefitting their country.

We hope, therefore, to indicate at least a partial solution to the problem by showing the true nature of patriotism. The whole question of the "why" and "how" of World government is as thoroughly involved as only a problem in human relations can be. Volumes have been written on its various phases, and volumes more will have to come before an integral solution is even theoretically in sight. Nevertheless the principles have been enunciated. We find them in our own nature, in the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and in the social encyclicals of the Popes. It behooves us then to apply these principles, lest from our indifference the life of man on earth be reduced to a genuine "dark age" such as this world has never seen.

Patriotism is a virtue that everyone is sure he possesses. It seems to be something that more or less grows up with us as we grow ourselves. And, in fact, for the most part this is quite true. To be patriotic is one of the things that comes most naturally to all of us. One can scarcely imagine a person whose heart doesn't beat a little faster during a Fourth of July parade: the stirring sound of band music, the staccato voice of drum and bugle corps, the groups of veterans marching along rather self-consciously; families and friends waving and shouting at their loved ones as they pass by on a warm and sunlit morning—such sights and sounds as these will always evoke in us a feeling of contentment. Everyone is friendly here, everyone is united in a common love for one another, and for the wonderful land we live in. We know, too, each one of us, the desire to do our part to assure that our name as a people and as a land, already so renowned, will always remain in high regard.

For most of us, patriotism remains pretty much of a feeling, a love really, a love of preference by which we love our country above all others.

By our "country" we do not mean just a physical thing, but in this notion we include the people of our land and their customs, the everyday common way of doing things. In peacetime its effects are most readily seen in the various community projects for local improvements either in the physical or cultural line. Businessmen and clubwomen are always ready to give freely of their time and effort to a multitude of such committees. Ordinarily though, these are not often thought of as examples of patriotism, for it is war and its super-charged emotions that we generally consider to be the proper field for patriotic action.

Patriotism is not Nationalism as we know it today. It is unfortunate that many people consider the two to be varying degrees of the same sentiment. Unfortunate, we say, because of the extreme aberrations of nationalism so prevelant in our time. Undoubtedly there has always been a sort of nationalistic or group sense of unity wherever a stable civilization has existed. Such a primitive type of group consciousness, however, was never based wholly on race or language as it is today, but more on a religious or social unity that was open to anyone who would conform to the local laws and customs.[3] In no way, however, can this be said of modern nationalistic theories. Their doctrines are best summed up in these two points.

1) That each nationality should constitute a united independent sovereign state, and

2) that every national state should expect and require of its citizens not only unquestioning obedience and supreme loyality, not only an exclusive patriotism, but also unshakable faith in its surpassing excellence over all other nationalities and lofty pride in its pecularities and its destiny.

This is nationalism, and it is a modern phenomenon.[4]

Certainly no true patriot can go along with such doctrines as these. "The patriot prefers his native land; he is not thereby intolerant or abusive, but has kindly consideration for the preference of others.[5]

St. Thomas' treatment of patriotism is quite short if you consider only the space it takes up in his Summa.[6] On the other hand, this one article can be developed into an extensive doctrine. For here, as always, St. Thomas is dealing in principles, and these have as many unique applications as there are individual circumstances.

We indicated, on an earlier page, that the fundamental basis for patriotism is the fact of a debt. It is in this way that St. Thomas explains it; He says:

3Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism,* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 26-29.

4*Ibid.*, p. 26.

5Gerard Joubert, O.P., *Qualities of Citizenship in St. Thomas,* (The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. LXV, Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1942,) p. 125.

6Indeed, he does not even treat of patriotism as such, but only as it is annexed to piety.

> Man is made the debtor of others in different ways according to their different excellence, and the different benefactions received from them. In both respects God holds the highest place. He is most excellent, and is the first principle of our being and governance. Secondarily, however, the principles of our being and education are our parents and our "patria," from whom and in which we have been given our birth and nurture. And thus, after God, man is most greatly indebted to his parents and his country. Wherefore just as it pertains to religion to give worship to God, it pertains to piety, in an inferior degree, to give honor to one's parents and to one's country.[7]

This article contains the two chief principles which are basic to all religious, filial, and patriotic duty. They are: (1) the excellence of paternity, i.e., the preeminence of a cause over its effect; and (2) the greatness of the benefits received from God, parents, and country. "Through the agency of God, parents and "patria" one receives his human life, one is conserved in being, instructed, and directed. To them is owed an incommensurable debt in strict justice.[8]

Note that St. Thomas says, ". . . it pertains to piety, . . . to give honor to one's parents and one's country." By the one word "piety" he is really referring to two distinct virtues, filial piety and patriotism. They are distinct since the contribution of our parents with respect to our existence is of much greater value than that of our country. Nevertheless, St. Thomas follows Cicero in using the more general term "piety" to include both virtues.[9]

For a correct knowledge of the role of patriotism we must understand it as it is a virtue. St. Thomas lists patriotism as one of the potential parts of the virtue of justice.[10] He treats of it as one of those good habits which channel or direct our energies so that we will do good rather than evil. We all have the knowledge that we must do what is good and avoid what is evil. This principle is basic in the moral order just as the principle of contradiction is basic in the intellectual order. But because we are free agents, undetermined, that is, to act in any set pattern, as animals are by their instincts, we need the help of the virtues in our every human act. Without them each good act would have to be preceded by a rational consideration of possible ends, and a conscious act of the will electing to do this particular thing. With the virtue in a more or less developed and perfect state this process is performed easily and swiftly, each action is done well, and even gives us a sense of pleasure. The notion that most people have that a morally good action is always a difficult one is of little value when examined in the light of the Thomistic teaching on the virtues.

To return to patriotism, we said that it is a potential part of the virtue of justice. Here we can easily note two things. First, it is a part of

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7St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (ed Leonina, Rome; Marietti, 1950), II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
8Joubert, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
9*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
10*Ibid.*, q. 80, a. un.

justice, and secondly, its relationship to justice is one of a particular type, that is, it is related as a potential part. Let us consider first the more general point, that of patriotism as it partakes of the notion of justice, for this will give us some idea of the formal cause or essence of patriotism. Now we know that the very idea of justice includes two formal notions: (1) it regulates our actions insofar as they affect other persons, and (2) more specifically, it inclines us to give to others what is due them.[11] In order that justice may produce these effects St. Thomas points out that the subject of justice is the will. Our intellect tells us how we should act, but it is our will which makes the final choice of doing this rather than that action.[12]

A more formal explanation is based on the notion of a habit as a virtue. Virtue is the act of a potency, and therefore the subject of a virtue is that potency whose act is rightly ordered by the virtue.[13] Take for example the skill of an efficient typist. The muscles of his fingers and arms are the potency or subject of his skill. The skill, in turn, is the act of the potency, the habit residing in its subject. It is in this way that the will, when formed by the virtue of justice, habitually gives to others what is their due.

It is essential for the proper understanding of justice to see that it is founded on our indebtedness with respect to the rights of others. In a similar manner, patriotism, as it participates justice, is also founded on the notion of indebtedness. Here, however, our indebtedness is not to every other person as such, but to that entity known as our country. And by our country, as we have noted, we do not mean merely the physical land in which we live, but that combination of land and people, be it large or small, which for every man has been from time immemorial a real cause of his birth, conservation, and education.

The second point we noted above in the relationship of patriotism to justice is that it is a potential part of justice. By this we mean that patriotism both partially agrees and partially disagrees with the virtue of justice in the strict sense. It is similar to justice in that it, too, is founded on the fact of a debt—the debt we owe to our country. Yet when compared to strict justice, it is dissimilar in that we can never render full payment of the debt we owe our country. If we owe a man five dollars then we are bound in justice to give him that amount. When we have done so a state of equality is established between ourselves and our former creditor. The debt is fully and completely removed. Such a state of equality can never be established between ourselves and our country. The reason for this lies ultimately in the superiority of a cause over its effect. Our country cooperates with God and our parents as an efficient cause of our being. To each of these we owe an infinite debt in pro-

11 *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 6 and a. 2.
12 *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 1.
13 *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 4.

portion to their efficacy. It is one we can never entirely repay, but only acknowledge by acts of honor, obedience, and gratitude.

There is still much that could be said of patriotism, for it is a virtue whose ramifications enter into each day of our life. Yet for the purpose of this article we believe that enough has been said to point out its two essential notes: (1) that it is founded on the fact of a debt—as patriots we are debtors—and that (2) the creditor involved in this relationship is our country. In terms of cause and effect, we are the effects; our country is the cause.

The patriot, then, must seek the welfare of his country. We can now ask, is a country the same as a state? The answer, as it so often happens, is not a simple yes or no but requires a distinction. A country and a state are materially the same but formally distinct. The distinction is important, we believe, because by it, and the parallel distinction between a patriot and a citizen, the exact role of the patriot is brought precisely into view.

As we have said a country is not merely the physical place of birth, but a combination of the land, the people, and their way of life. These three factors denote the triple contribution which a country makes to its sons. A man's natural viewpoint on life can be genuinely affected by the fact of his living in a mountainous area rather than on the plains; again, the racial temperament of the stock from which he comes makes a most direct contribution to his character; and finally, a way of life is a constant factor in our everyday education in living.

A state, however, is quite different. True, it is natural to man as is patriotism, but its production and organization require an act of the will. It always presupposes a country: "Whereas a state is a community organized for political action, a country is a community, of its nature requiring organization, but not any particular from."[14]

The particular type of political organization found in a country may or may not be doing a good job in assisting its citizens in their pursuit of the common good. Consequently the patriot can heartily dislike his government, and still love his country. This fact was clearly exemplified in the Axis-occupied countries during the last war.

The distinction between a country and a state is neatly summarized in the following:

> A country is largely a product of nature. It is a territory, and a community of many persons each with natural aspirations towards personal well-being, and each with natural inclinations towards social collaboration. A state, on the other hand, is a product of human intelligence, will, and effort. It implies organization, which is something super-added to a community.[15]

14Joubert, *op. cit.*, *p.* 132.
15*Ibid.*, p. 131.

The parallel distinction between a citizen and a patriot are further explained on the basis of the type of casuality involved. Thus:

> The quality of being a citizen is different from that of being a patriot. The citizen is a member of a political organization. The patriot is a native son. The subjection involved in citizenship is that established by final causality, or ordination to an end. The subjection of a patriot is that set up by efficient causality. Whereas the citizen, as such, exists for the common good, the patriot does not exist *for* his country, rather he exists *of* and *by* his country. The patriot is an effect.[16]

Consider once again our original question. Is it contrary to the virtue of patriotism to support a trend towards world government? We know now that patriotism is a virtue annexed to justice, and founded on the debt we owe our country for its efficient causality in creating, conserving, and and educating us in being. Our country, as the object of our patriotic duty, is not the same as the state under which we live. It is evident, then, that it is the duty of a patriot to do whatever he can to secure and maintain the welfare of his country. The greatest contribution he can make to the common good of his country is to maintain it in a just and honorable peace. In order to do this he cooperates with other patriots and initiates a new type of society—a political society. As a member of this political society he is a citizen; a partner united with others in working for the common good. In this way the state came into being. The organization of the state depends on the free will of its members. They are seeking the common good of a virtuous life. That this might be obtained it is absolutely necessary that their society be at peace. They therefore choose whatever level of organization they deem will most efficiently produce their end. Historically the tribal form of political society came first, then the city, then the state, and finally the consolidation of several states into a form of union depending on the type of government they adopt.

Since it is not the patriot as patriot who is concerned with political matters, it cannot be contrary to the virtue of patriotism to support any particular type of political structure so long as it offers reasonable probability of assuring the welfare of his country. It pertains primarily to the patriot to consider the welfare of his country, and therefore whatever type of political organization will secure this welfare is the one he will support.

Those who support every type of agitation against the internationalist movement have a mistaken notion of the proper task of a patriot. In attempting to uphold the completely autonomous sphere of their own nation's activities they err on two points. In the first place they equate the country with th state, and thus the duties of the patroit with those of the citizen. Secondly, they degrade the role of the citizen, for their totalitarian concept of the state denies to the citizen his efficient causality in the inception and organization of the state.

16*Ibid.*, p. 147.

Even supposing the *de facto* existence of a genuine world government, the integrity of our patriotism would not be injured. One could still be a true patriot with respect to his native land, and at the same time a true citizen with respect to membership in a world political organization.

In summary, then, we say that we are in debt to our parents and to the particular part of the world in which we were born and live (or to our country) by reason of the efficient causality they have exercised in contributing under God to our existence and well-being. Patriotism is an indebtedness by reason of efficient causality. The debt can never be fully repaid, but the patriot offers token recompense through the acts of honor, obedience, and gratitude. Through the organization of the state, patriots, now under the formality of citizens, seek to secure for their country the benefits of peace. However, it does not seem difficult to prove on the basis of historical and psychological arguments that at the present time only a world government can be the efficient cause of world peace. Therefore, not only would a patriot not sin against his patriotism by supporting a trend towards such world government, but his very virtue of patriotism would require him to do all in his power to support it. This fact does not nullify our obligations to our particular country for we would still remain indebted to it for its own peculiar contributions to our being and our welfare.

Peter Martyr West, O.P.

Exegete-For-A-Day

PERHAPS IT SEEMS ALMOST A DESECRATION to take a work as lofty and as conducive to contemplation as the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, and proceed to cut it open looking for "problems." Yet this is precisely what we shall do in the pages which follow. Such a textual operation, it must be granted, could be performed by skilled exegetes with little fear of permanent harm to the beauty and significance of the Prologue's eighteen verses. But when the task is taken up by the unsteady hands of one who can be described only as an "exegete-for-a-day," such confidence quickly vanishes. What were initially simply problems, may well become unsurmountable obstacles! This is by way of warning.

It can be safely stated at the outset that there are in the Prologue of the fourth Gospel what biblical scholars have called textual difficulties. They are not, by any means, of recent discovery nor are their proposed solutions purely academic matters. In fact historically they are very real, and even today scholars are in some disagreement among themselves as to the preferability of one solution over another.

This is true especially of the first textual difficulty we will discuss here, a difficulty centering round a question of grammatical punctuation in verses three and four of the Prologue. In earlier centuries this point of grammar, understandably enough, was the cause of serious theological confusions; heretical sects, quite naturally, advocating a settlement favorable to their religious innovataions, and the orthodox taking quite another path. And even within the orthodox camps there was not complete unanimity.

The following pages, then, are meant to be a summary presentation of this problem of punctuation and of a second difficulty, namely, that presented by the verb-form in verse twelve and thirteen. The work is intended not only to outline the nature of the difficulties but also to indicate the solutions which are offered by contemporary Catholic exegetes. The work is divided into two equal parts, each dealing with its particular problem which are, as the reader will discover, unrelated.

In the ancient Greek manuscripts, both profane and religious, word-separation and sentence punctuation were unknown literary luxuries. This is true also of the Christian New Testament writings as late as the start of the fifth century. Thus the autograph copy of St. John's Gospel, the work as it came from his hands, was most certainly unpunctuated. As time went on, the Church Fathers and particularly St. Jerome (347-419), and copyists generally began to divide the texts for purposes of convenience and better understanding. But since no over-all authority directed this work of division into phrases and sentences, variant and even contradictory readings quickly appeared.

Such was the case with verses three and four of the Prologue. At one time or another there were actually *four* variant readings for these verses, all of them different but yet each proposed as being most in harmony with the sense of the Scripture. Three of these readings require special and somewhat detailed consideration here. The fourth, that suggested by St. Epiphanius (315-403) and by St. Hilary (315-368), has never been well-regarded by exegetes nor widely accepted. The reading, moreover, has been described by one Catholic scholar as "eccentric,"[1] and it will be omitted from the present discussion.

In present-day English translations, the verses in question read familiarly:

> All things were made through him,
> and without him was made
> nothing that has been made.
>
> In him was life,
> and the life was the light of men.[2]

As they stand the verses seem to present no difficulties at all. To the modern English bible reader, the present rendering is well-known and intelligible, besides being dogmatically sound. The reader, however, in order to grasp the problem hidden behind these verses, should try to imagine a time when all the words of these verses were run together, that is, undivided by commas and periods and the like. It would appear something like this: *all things were made through him and without him was made nothing that has been made in him was life and the life was the light of men* . . . It may not be immediately evident to the reader that more than one mode of punctuation is possible, with, of course, resulting variations in meaning and emphasis naturally following. But in the original Greek and Hebrew texts and versions, due to the very nature of those Oriental languages, the possibility of more than one grammatical unit was quickly seen and capitalized on. To better understand the following discussion it is necessary, then, to keep the above facts in mind for, historically, they explain in part the origin and reason for the prob-

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1Ferdinand Prat, S.J., *Jesus Christ* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1950), vol I, p. 467.

2John, 1:3-4 (Confraternity Translation).

lem. Our purpose here is simply to determine which of the proposed readings does in fact give to the text its most acceptable meaning.

We may begin with that variant reading first suggested by St. Augustine (354-430) and later accepted by St. Thomas Aquinas (1222-1274). It is also the one favored by numerous non-Catholic commentators of our own time, such as Westcott, Loisy, and Wordsworth-White. According to this opinion, the verses should be punctuated thus: *without him nothing was made. That which was made, in him was life.*[3] For Augustine and Thomas the words *that which was made in him was life* (quod factum est in ipso vita erat) ought to form an independent grammatical unit, set off from what has gone before and from what follows. For them *that which was made* and *life* are in apposition to each other and their identification—if it can be termed that—is localized in the Word, *in ipso.*

To justify this manner of punctuation St. Thomas points out that all existing beings can be looked at from two different points of view: first, as they exist *in themselves* and secondly, as they exist *in their Cause,* the Word or Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Now, as they exist in themselves and outside of God, so to speak, they are not all living nor are they all alive. At best, only some of them are: men, for example, and beasts and plants. So considered, these living things cannot be said *to be* life, but rather only as *possessing* life.

On the other hand, when these same things are considered as existing *in the Word* as in their Cause, the story is quite different. For in the Word, they become identified *with* the Word and since the Word is life, they become identified with life itself. They become what we describe as "divine ideas" – those ideas or images which exist spiritually in the wisdom of God and according to which things are produced *ad extra* by the entire Godhead. To clarify his point, St. Thomas gives this example:

> —a chest made by a cabinet-maker in itself is neither living nor is it life. The plan of the chest, however, the exemplar in the mind of the cabinet-maker, is *in some sense alive* because in his mind it has *intelligible being.* However, it cannot be said to be life simply because the man's act of knowing is not identified with his essence nor with his existence.[4]

The same is not true, the saint continues, when these notions of exemplar and artist are transferred to God. The divine ideas are not really distinct from the divine intellect itself, nor is the divine intellect really distinct from the divine essence and existence. St. Thomas concludes, then, that all things, considered as ideas existing in the Divine Mind,

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3St. Thomas, *Super Evangelium S. Joannis Lectura* (Rome-Turin: Marietti, 1952. Raphaelis Cai, O.P., ed.), lect. II, ch. I, § 68 ff.

4". . . *sicut arca facta per artificem in se quidem nec vivit nec vita est, ratio vero arcae, quae praecessit in mente artificis, vivit quodammodo, inquantum habet esse intelligible in mente artificis, non tamen est vita, quia per ipsum intelligere artificis non est in sua essentia, neque suum esse.*" *'Ibid.,* ch III, § 91.

can truly be said *to be life.* According to St. Augustine and St. Thomas this is the truest sense of the verses and is best brought out by their form of punctuation: *without him was made nothing. That which was made, in him was life,* (quod factum est, in ipso vita erat).

It must be admitted that modern commentators regard this interpretation with marked reserve. The eminent scholar, M. J. Vosté of the Order of Preachers, will concede that it is a fine statement of the Platonic-Augustinian doctrine of exemplarism, but he rejects it as having no relevance here. Fr. Vosté, moreover, agrees with another commentator, Fr. H. Simon, who has said that the doctrine is indeed appealing and wonderfully worked out, "but it seems to be foreign to the context.[5] It is their opinion that the Evangelist, in verses three and four, is not speaking about the Word or the Logos as viewed in Itself, as Augustine and Thomas hold, but of the Word as related to the universe of which He is the Creator. Consequently, creatable things should not be considered as identified with the Godhead but rather as individual realities existing as distinct from God, but made by him. St. John is looking at things, so Fr. Vosté believes, after their creation, not before.

In addition, although scholars will admit the antiquity of this reading, they nevertheless regard it as suspect on the grounds that it may well have had its origin among early Gnostic sects. They point out also that grammatical changes of verb-forms and subject would be demanded if this reading were correct: *was* in the phrase *in him was life* would become *is,* and *that which was made* would become the subject in place of the *Word.* It is on these grounds, then, that modern exegetes regard this variant reading as unacceptable.

A second variant reading was advocated by the famous Origen (185-253?) and by the equally famous heresiarch Arius (265-336), along with numerous Manichaean and Gnostic sects. Origen, however, did manage to give the reading a carefully-worded orthodox signification. The sects, on the other hand, preferred to see in it the scriptural basis for their non-conformist theories.

This new manner of punctuation differs from the first merely in the location of a comma, it does preserve the same grammatical unit: thus *without him nothing was made* remains unchanged—there being no problem here. But the phrase *that which was made in him was life* is now read with a punctuation mark, a comma, after the word *him: that which was made in him, was life,* (quod factum est in ipso, vita erat). Compare this with St. Augustine's *that which was made, in him was life.*

By this simple device several new possibilities of meaning suggest themselves. The Manichaeans, for instance, drew this conclusion from the line thus punctuated: all *inanimate* beings were caused efficiently

5 "*Pulchra sane et mirabilis doctrina . . . sed a contextu aliena videtur.*" (*Studia Joannea* [Rome: Collegio Angelico, 1930], p. 41.)

by a cause other than the Word. They insisted that the text actually says that all things made by the Word (quod factum est in ipso) are living things (vita erat), Where you find living realities, then, you find effects of the Word's efficient causality. On the other hand, however, where you find non-living realities (like dust and stones and matter generally) you must look for an efficient cause *other than the Word.* The Word is the Cause of living things, they concluded, but something else is the cause of non-living things—and all this from the text thus punctuated.

The Gnostics, too, derived certain advantages from such a reading. The phrase *that which was made by (in) him* (quod factum est in ipso) was for them a clear reference to their so-called "spiritual men," those alone who were in possession of the "true life." The text in question was also used to explain the origin of Zoe, the feminine eon, whom the Gnostics held *was made in the Word* (quod factum est in ipso).

St. Thomas reviewed the Manichaean interpretation in his Commentary on St. John's Gospel.[6] There he counters the heretics on their own ground by taking their proposed reading of the text and, like Origen before him, finding for it an orthodox signification. The phrase *that which was made in him, was life* can mean (so St. Thomas states) that a being made or created by the Word is life *casually,* that is, as existing in its cause.

> All effects pre-exist in their causes, existing there not by their own proper *esse* but by the *esse* proper to the cause itself; and this is true of the effects, produced by God. They too pre-exist in their cause, God, and since God is life, they pre-exist *in Life* with the very *esse* proper to God Himself.[7]

If you argue, therefore, that "that which is made by (in) the Word, is life" and if by this you mean "life in its cause," then the sense of the text is Catholic and valid: this is St. Thomas' conclusion.

It is a conclusion, however, which modern critics, including Fr. Vosté, find untenable. In his critique of the reading,[8] no matter whether it be given an orthodox meaning or not, the Belgian Dominican views with disfavor what he regards as a misuse of the word *in.* He insists that in the phrase *in ipso,* the word *in* must be understood literally; it cannot be taken as equivalent to the Latin preposition *per* (through, or by means of) without grave harm being done to the text itself. Thus the Gnostics erred in giving the word *in* the force of efficient causality which in reality it does not grammatically possess. Nor may any meaning be given to the phrase *in ipso* which would imply or suggest mutations in the Divine Person of the Word. The Evangelist has already affirmed his belief in the divinity of the Word; he would not here, in verses three and four, be implying anything less than that.

6Lect. II, ch. III, § 89.
7*Ibid.,* § 90.
8*Op. cit.,* p. 40.

Still another variant reading, the last we shall consider, is the reading preferred by St. John Chrysostom (344-407) and by all the Greek Fathers and scholars after him, including the famous and controversial Theodore of Mopsuestia (350-428). It was also the choice of St. Jerome in the Western Church and is today by far the most widely accepted reading: M. J. Lagrange, O.P., and Fr. Vosté accept it as genuine, as does Fr. F. Prat, S.J. Indeed it is the grammatical unit in use in our English Bibles today:

> All things were made through him,
> and without him was made
> nothing that has been made.
>
> In him was life,
> and the life was the light of men.

As the reader can see, this manner of punctuation differs considerably from those suggested above, in as much as it presents a distinctly new grammatical unity. The phrase *that which was made* (quod factum est) is no longer conceived of as belonging to what follows (in ipso vita erat); rather it is here joined to what precedes, namely, the phrase *without him was made nothing* (sine ipso factum est nihil). In this way the first half of verse three is allowed to be read independently, the sense being "*all* things came into existence through him." *Without him was made nothing that has been made*, the second half of verse three, is similarly to be understood independently: the sense clearly being "nothing whatever came into existence apart from him." And with verse four an entirely new thought begins: In him was life. . .

St. Thomas in his Commentary, attributing this mode of punctuation initially to St. Chrysostom, adds that among the Greeks Chrysostom is of such great authority that no one ever adopts any other meaning than that which Chrysostom adopts in his writings. Hence it is that all Greek manuscripts use this particular reading.[9]

St. Jerome is a witness to the fact that this reading was also accepted in the schools at Alexandria and throughout Egypt. The saint is reported to have said that the majority of the instructed faithful read the text as here presented.[10]

Besides the imposing weight of external testimonies in its favor, this reading does emphatically complete the force of the Evangelist's thought. It is in effect an affirmation of the Word's universal efficient causality: nothing exists which has escaped the creative embrace of the Word: nothing is exempt from the Word's existential influence. This manifest emphasis seems to be exactly what the Evangelist was aiming at when he wrote: *nothing whatever came into existence apart from him.*

But what, then, is to be said of the other variant readings, even those capable of enjoying an orthodox meaning? Simply this: modern Catholic

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9St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, § 94.
10Prat, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

exegetes feel that these readings and interpretations do not convey St. John's intended meaning. It is to be observed that the punctuation and explanation proposed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and by Origen, are strongly philosophical whereas the Evangelist wrote as a mystic and primarily as a theologian. For these reasons, then, Catholic biblical commentators prefer to follow St. Chrysostom's reading as alone reflecting the true mind of the apostolic writer.

The second textual difficulty which concerns us here is that found in verses twelve and thirteen of the Prologue. The reader, perhaps, recalls the literary and theological development of the Prologue: the Evangelist began by treating of the Divine Word in relation to the entire Trinity (verses one and two), to creation (verse three), and to mankind (verses four and five). Then he relates the account of the Word's coming to earth, mentioning first the mission of John the Baptist (verses six to eight), then the subsequent rejection of the Word by men (verses nine to eleven) and finally disclosing the possibility of divine sonship for those men who do in fact accept the Word (verses twelve and thirteen).

The entire Prologue then concludes with a profound statement of the Evangelist's deep religious faith; he confesses that the personality of the Word is "full of grace and truth," predicating of Him a fullness of divine life of which "we have all received".[11]

Here, however, we shall restrict ourselves to verses twelve and thirteen, for biblical scholars have discovered in these verses a rather interesting problem. We shall attempt first to state the problem and then to offer its most probable solution. The verses in question are familiar enough:

> But to as many as received him
> he gave the power of becoming sons of God;
> to those who believe in his name:
>
> Who were born not of blood.
> nor of the will of the flesh,
> nor of the will of man,
> but of God.[12]

And it seems well to include here also the Latin equivalent of these verses, for the problem historically begins in the Latin language, and the stages of its development can more easily be followed if a Latin text is readily available. Thus:

> Quotquot autem receperunt eum,
> dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri,
> his qui credunt in nomine eius:
>
> Qui non ex sanguinibus,
> neque ex voluntate carnis,
> neque ex voluntate viri,
> sed ex Deo nati sunt.

11John, 1:14, 16.
12John, 1:12-13.

These verses, when read and understood together, form a continuous and unified sequence of thought. For this reason they stand grammatically independent of the preceding verse *He came unto his own, and his own received him not,* and of the following verse *And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.* The precise problem in these verses, then, is not a disputed question of punctuation as it was above; it is rather a question revolving round the *verb-form* used in verse thirteen. In other words, the problem is the Latin *nati sunt,* which, in English translations, is rendered *were born.*

It is this plural form of the verb with which we are most familiar. All modern editions of the New Testament preserve it; it is the form used in the Latin Vulgate of St. Jerome. And it is found in the well-received translation of the New Testament made from the original Greek by the noted Dominican scholar-priest, Francis A. Spencer.[13]

The plural verb agrees grammatically with a compound subject, embracing both *those who receive him* and *those who believe in his name.* Those persons are intended who are born not from blood, nor from carnal desire, nor from the will of man, but solely from God. The sense here, then, is obviously to be understood of spiritual regeneration and rebirth of believers in Jesus Christ. These verses are seen to be a description, by a process of elimination, if you wish, of how Christians become and are sons of God—by being born of him spiritually.

Well, then, where is the problem? Seemingly there is none. But to answer the question we must take several giant steps back through the centuries to the days of the early Church Fathers. It is there that the problem begins.

St. Ignatius of Antioch and St. Irenaeus and Tertullian—all of whom lived during the last half of the first century and the first half of the second century—frequently made allusions to our particular passage in the Prologue. Indeed they often quoted it directly and when they did, and here is the beginning of the trouble, they invariably cast the verb in verse thirteen into a *singular form* (natus est) and not into the plural with which we are acquainted. With such a construction these Fathers treated the passage as a clear and emphatic description of the Virgin-Birth of Christ. They understood that it was Christ who was born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; the line for them was *not* a reference to Christian rebirth in God.

Excerpts from the writings of the Fathers will make their understanding of the passage quite clear: St. Irenaeus, for instance, writes in his famous *Adversus Haereses*:

13*The New Testament of Our Lord and Savior and Jesus Christ* (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1937).

> Not by the will of the flesh nor by the will of man but by the will of God was the Word made flesh.[14]

and in another place of the same work he writes

> He who was not born either by the will of the flesh or by the will of man is the Son of man, this is Christ the Son of the Living God.[15]

Tertullian's witness to this reading is even more forceful, however. In the *De Carne Christi* Tertullian asks a question concerning the point at issue:

> What is the force (Tertullian says) of "Not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God *was He born?*"
>
> The Valentinians adulterate the passage contending that it was thus written: "not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of that of man but of God *were they born," as if* St. John were designating the above mentioned believers in His name.[16]

This of course is a striking statement. Tertullian is expressly accusing the heretical Valentinian sect of adulterating a scriptural text; their plural verb-form and their composite meaning, he says, is nothing less than a corruption of the inspired passage. And if in this he is correct, then we moderns are equally guilty, for we, too, read and interpret the passage in the plural sense. Thus Tertullian would have us squarely on the heretics' side of the fence. And he continues his argument:

> But how can their (the Valentinians') meaning be correct? For all who believe in the name of the Lord are, according to the common law of mankind, sons of blood and of the will of the flesh and of man—even Valentinus himself.
>
> Therefore (he concludes) this text is written in the singular and is to be referred to the Lord: *and he was born of God* . . . . and rightly so because Christ is in fact the Word of God.[17]

Clearly, then, there is no question at all in Tertullian's mind as to the grammar and meaning of the text. And it is not surprising to find modern critics of considerable repute, for example, the non-Catholics Harnack and Zahn, accepting Tertullian's reading as genuine. Zahn actually speaks of this passage as a beautiful confession of faith in the doctrine of the Virgin-Birth.

And this is precisely the core of the problem. Which of the two readings is correct? That argued for by Tertullian and certain of his contemporaries? Or that reading, accepted by the Valentinians, which he described as a textual corruption?

Father Le Frois' interesting review of the problem, from which we have already quoted and upon which we depend for much of this material, indicates that the question is still of modern concern. Fr. Le Frois

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14Cf. Bernard J. LeFrois, "The Spiritual Motherhood of Mary," in *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* vol 13, no. 4; October, 1951, p. 425.
15*Ibid.*
16*Ibid.*, pg. 425-6.
17*Ibid.*, p. 426.

attempts to answer the difficulty first by an examination of external evidences favoring the singular reading, and then by an internal criticism of the Prologue itself. We will here preserve his order or procedure, at the same time supplementing it with the opinions of Fr. M. J. Vosté; in this way we hope to reach a conclusion which reflects present-day Catholic exegesis of the matter.

After investigating external witnesses, Fr. Le Frois concludes that no Greek codices, no papyri, no lectionaries extant use the singular verb-form. Among the versions, moreover, only the Old Latin Codex Veronensis has the singular verb.[18] Merck believes, however, that the Syriac Curetonian text and certain copies of the Syrian Peshitto should be added to the external witnesses for the singular. These, then, plus the authority of St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian, and of the moderns Harnack and Zahn, are the only testimonies in its behalf.

On the other side, our side, and paradoxically the Valentinians' side of the fence, the authorities are far more impressive. St. Clement of Alexandria (150-200), Origen, the historian Eusebius (265-339?), St. Ambrose (333-397), St. Augustine and St. Thomas, all favor and use the plural meaning: as do all extant Greek manuscripts. Of the same conviction among the moderns are the Catholics Lagrange and Vosté of the Order of Preachers, and the non-Catholics Wescott and Van Soden and others. They unhesitatingly accept the plural meaning as genuine to St. John and as canonical.

Fr. Vosté, for example, shows that plural verb *nati sunt* dovetails very well with the Evangelist's doctrine on spiritual regeneration found elsewhere in his writings: in the third chapter of his Gospel, as an instance, and in his First Epistle. The Dominican further points out that when critics insist on the plural meaning, they are not at the same time insisting that the Evangelist had no knowledge of Christ's supernatural birth, as some have claimed. St. John penned his fourth Gospel towards the end of the first century and in content it presupposes the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark, written much earlier. He could not, then, have been ignorant of the great stress they placed upon the fact of Christ's supernatural birth. Actually John's mystical yet accurate description of a believer's rebirth in God seems rather to suggest a keen awareness of the Virgin-Birth. For in fact both Jesus Christ and the believer are truly *born of God*, although in different ways: the contemplative Apostle could not have failed to see this. As Fr. Vosté declares: "The Synoptics taught the supernatural conception of the physical Christ; John, the mystical theologian, writes of the divine regeneration of the believers, united to Christ as branches are united to the vine."[19]

18*Ibid.*, p. 428.

19"Synoptici tradunt supernaturalem conceptionem Christi. Ioannes, mysticus theologus, divinam regenerationem docet credentium, Christo unitorum, tamquam palmitum viti." (*Op. cit.*, p. 59-60.)

It remains, now, to explain how the singular reading clearly advocated by Tertullian ever came to be regarded as genuine. Undoubtedly this third century writer had access to a Greek codex or scroll with such a reading. How explain this codex's inaccuracy?

In Scriptural exegesis, and here we are following Fr. Le Frois, this basic scientific principle dominates: *the text with the more difficult reading has, by very reason of its inherent problems, more to recommend it (as genuine) than a text with a less difficult reading.* The validity of this principle should be readily seen: as it stands, a "difficult text" could not itself be the result of attempts at simplification, correction or the like. If the simplifying process were carried out successfully, a text would no longer be hard to decipher. So with the point at hand: if Tertullian's reading of verse thirteen is as clear and as readily understandable as certain critics claim it is, then how did the not-so-clear, the questionable plural reading, ever come to have such wide acceptance?

Zahn, for example, actually speaks of the singular reading as a "clear idea" and a "plain confession" of the Virgin-Birth of Christ.[20] Now, if Zahn is right, and if St. John's meaning is so immediately intelligible, is it likely that an unintelligible version (so these critics would describe the plural form) would ever come to be popularly substituted for it? Seemingly not. In fact, the exact opposite would be true. A difficult text, or a text which is at least superficially difficult, would chronologically be first; then, gradually, the text would be tampered with in an effort towards clarification. This, perhaps, was the case with the Prologue's verse thirteen. The plural reading was the first to appear; it was replaced in those texts available to Tertullian by the singular form, probably because a copyist felt that the words applied more properly to Christ than to the body of the faithful.

Modern Catholic exegetes, however, would hold in this case that the copyist was mistaken. Not that the Evangelist's words cannot be applied to Christ's birth: in themselves they can, of course. The point the exegetes make, however, is that such an application *is not the intention of the sacred writer.* St. John, in their opinion, is simply presenting here the true genealogy of those who by faith become sons of God: their spiritual rebirth does not derive from the will of the flesh nor from the will of man, but solely from God's gift of Himself. This is the Evangelist's sense, and only this.

We began these pages with the observation that we were about to "cut open" St. John's Prologue with a view to disclosing certain problems contained in it. And we warned the reader of the possible results. We now can only hope that no grave harm has been done. It would be unfortunate if in future contacts with the Prologue the reader were aware

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20Cf. LeFrois, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

merely of the textual difficulties found in it. This would be to overlook its simple yet profound beauty, its candor of expression, and its religious depth. And this would certainly be a tragedy, for the Beloved Apostle has much to say to us, and we are far the richer for the saying.

Mark Sullivan, O.P.

CHRONICLE

His Eminence, Giuseppe Cardinal Pizzardo, Prefect of the Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood in September. On this happy occasion the members of St. Albert's Province joined with the entire Catholic world in thanking His Eminence for his untiring, devoted service to the Holy See, and in wishing him many years of continued success in the position he holds in the Church.

The Most Reverend Emmanuel Suarez, Master General of the Order of Preachers, was a visitor to the province of St. Albert in September. At that time His Paternity presided at the *ad gradus* examinations held at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque. The following members of the province were examined: the Very Reverend T. M. Cain, O.P., the Very Reverend P. M. Clancy, O.P., the Reverends R. V. Hughes, O.P., A. A. Norton, O.P., and E. F. Almeida, O.P. Father Almeida is the newly-appointed Regent of Studies in the Province of St. Catherine in Ecuador.

On September 30, at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque, the Master General, acting in his capacity as Grand Chancellor of the Pontifical University, the *Angelicum,* Rome, and with the special authorization of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, conferred the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology, *honoris causa,* on the Most Reverend Henry P. Rohlman, D.D., Archbishop of Dubuque.

At the same ceremony, His Paternity conferred the degree of Master of Sacred Theology on the Very Reverend E. L. Hughes, O.P., Provincial of St. Albert's Province, and the Very Reverend J. R. Gillis, O.P., professor of dogmatic theology at St. Rose Priory.

On November 10, His Eminence Samuel Cardinal Stritch, Archbishop of Chicago, in the name of the Master General, conferred the degree of Master of Sacred Theology on the Very Reverend P. M. Clancy, O.P., at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois. Father Clancy

is sub-prior of the House of Studies and an official in the Archdiocesan Chancery Office in Chicago.

After the conferring of this degree, the Very Reverend Sebastian Carlson, O.P., Regent of Studies of the Province of St. Albert and President of the Pontifical Faculty at River Forest, read documents from the Master General appointing new officials in the faculties of philosophy and theology of the Province. The Very Reverend G. R. Joubert, O.P., was named *Baccalaureus* of the Studium Generale and Vice-President of the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy. The Very Reverend A. A. Norton, O.P., was named Master of Studies of the Studium Generale and of the Faculty of Philosophy. The Very Reverend J. R. Gillis, O.P., was appointed *Lector Primarius* of the Studium at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque, replacing Father Norton, whose administrative ability guided this part of the Studium Generale of the Province so well during the first years of its existence.

In a few short months two charter members of the REALITY staff will be raised to the priesthood. The present staff and all who have been connected with the publication of REALITY take this occasion to thank Brothers Damian Fandal, O.P., and Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., for their generous efforts, accurate guidance, and inspiration during the four years they have served as editors.

Just as we go to press, word has been cabled from Vatican City to the Very Rev. Edward L. Hughes, O.P., Provincial of the Dominican Fathers of the Province of St. Albert the Great, at Chicago, of the nomination of Father Thaddeus Lawton, O.P. as Prefect Apostolic of the newly created Prefecture of Sokoto in N. W. Nigeria.

The Prefecture of Sokoto is a vast, rather undeveloped, solidly Mohammedan territory, about the size of New England. It is one thousand miles distant from Lagos, the Capitol and great seaport of Nigeria. It was in Lagos that Father Hughes established just three years ago, a foundation of Dominican Fathers at the invitation of the then Apostolic Delegate to British Africa, Most Rev. David Mathews, and the Archbishop of Lagos, Most Rev. Leo Taylor, S.M.A. A few weeks ago this foundation was canonically erected as the Parish of St. Dominic, with Father Michael Dempsey, O.P., as Pastor, and Fathers Arthur Kinsella, O.P. and Lewis M. Shea, O.P. as Assistants.

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